Ontario Street

Acta's Triage

2010-05-24T23:08:00.009-05:00

Welcome to Cleveland, Manny Acta.

Only 35 games into his inaugural season as Cleveland’s manager, Acta had two of the three normally reliable players on his roster taken away. With shortstop Asdrubal Cabrera out until at least late July (8-10 weeks was the formal diagnosis, excluding minor league rehab time) and center fielder Grady Sizemore benched with a bum knee that may require surgery (he's soliciting second and third opinions from specialists this week), things are looking grim for the Tribe.

That’s not to say things were going according to plan beforehand, but few teams would be expected to fully recover after the loss of two cornerstone players (especially a team that’s already dug itself a bit of a hole in the standings).

You have to give Acta credit though, he’s maintained a positive attitude throughout, hoping it rubs off on the rest of the team as they try and find their way out of the basement (or at least to the top of the stairs).

"I choose to have a good attitude,” Acta explained, “You have to lead by example. If you come dragging in with your head down, you send the wrong message." It may sound like the usual dose of manager rhetoric (formerly referred to in this space as ‘Wedge Speak’), but the way Acta communicates and projects himself provides a stark contrast with his predecessor.

Acta’s main goal, especially with the younger players, is to hammer home the fundamentals (defense, smart base running, throwing strikes). Parts of his message have already translated to the field (fewer errors being committed), while others aren’t quite there (last in the AL in first-pitch strike percentage). However, I think the reason Acta will ultimately be successful is that the players see the enthusiasm and sincerity in how he approaches his job and it leaves them wanting to meet those expectations. They want to match Acta’s passion for the game and put forth their best effort.

I think Acta’s communication skills (in English or Español) and advanced knowledge of the game will allow him to engage and encourage his players in a way that Eric Wedge could not. Eventually, Wedge’s rigid system broke down under pressure and the team lost faith in his leadership. Acta has yet to be tested in a high stakes season (expectations for 2010 were understandably low), but it will be interesting to see how this team responds to pressure situations under his watch.

For now, Acta is tasked with installing his system and evaluating and developing personnel for the future. I’m confident Cleveland’s new manager has the team on the right track, even if recent trends have been disconcerting (to put it lightly).

The current challenge is to assemble a productive offense around Shin Soo Choo, some veteran spring training invitees, and a bunch of kids not yet accustomed to hitting in the Majors. As daunting as that may sound, I’m of the opinion that the day-to-day batting order doesn’t matter nearly as much as providing the players with a defined role and the appropriate amount of playing time.

Acta has expressed his desire to win, but understands that “we have to develop players too.” The skipper recognizes the value in the remaining three-quarters of the season to further develop a young, largely inexperienced, and not quite cohesive unit into a respectable squad for the second half of 2010 and beyond. So what can we expect as far as playing time, minor league call-ups, and roster management while Cabrera and Sizemore are sidelined?

Jason Donald will be the Tribe’s starting shortstop for the foreseeable future. Donald, acquired from Philadelphia as part of the Cliff Lee package, had zero experience at the major league level before his debut on May 18. Donald had built a strong case for a promotion in Triple-A Columbus this season, compiling a .277/.396/.423 line with 10 doubles, 2 triples, 2 homers, and 10 stolen bases in 165 PA. With Luis Valbuena’s game coming apart at the seams (54 OPS+, 5 errors on the season), Donald was already on the fast track for a promotion.

Valbuena’s performance and the sudden injury to Cabrera paved the way for Donald to be named starter, ready or not. Spring training invitee Mark Grudzielanek had already earned the everyday second baseman’s gig of his own merit, leaving Valbuena in a reduced role as utility infielder.

The veteran Grudzielanek provides a significant upgrade over Valbuena in every aspect of the game, except power (which is irrelevant, since Valbuena’s power stroke has yet to return). Grudz may be a journeyman at this point in his career, but he still has an above-average glove and had a .345 OBP in 2008 (he missed most of 2009 due to a back injury).

Acta’s initial endorsement of Valbuena as the team’s second baseman at the start of the season looks hollow in hindsight. Valbuena already had one foot out the door prior to Donald’s arrival, but the organization isn’t ready to give up on him. Valbuena will continue to see a start or two each week, likely confined to second base, to allow him to work through his funk at the plate. Even if they fall into a slump, Donald and Grudzielanek’s defense will keep them in the lineup.

Andy Marte is due to come off the DL next week, but a lack of extra middle infielders (Peralta will not be playing short, says Acta) on the 25-man roster may see the recently recalled Shelley Duncan (currently occupying Sizemore’s roster spot) get sent down instead of Valbuena. Remember, Marte is out of minor league options.

Trevor Crowe was actually called up to spell Marte, but his fate is now tied to that of Sizemore’s knee. Crowe had been on the coaching staff’s radar after a memorable effort in spring training, only to lose the fourth outfielder gig to Michael Brantley (who appeared in a grand total of 9 games).

Some fans may be wondering why Trevor Crowe got called up instead of Brantley. Crowe’s promotion was initially in response to Andy Marte’s injury, meaning the team wasn’t planning on keeping him up for more than a couple weeks. The organization wanted Brantley (and Donald for that matter) to continue seeing everyday at-bats in Triple-A, so they were passed over. When Crowe caught fire in Cleveland, he gave little reason for the club to demote him even after the prognosis on Sizemore’s knee got worse. Why mess with a good thing?

Personally, I’m glad the team stuck with Crowe. There are too many first-round picks wasting away in Triple-A in this organization. If Crowe has something to offer, the team couldn’t have been handed a better opportunity to find out. Crowe is 26 years old, already has 202 major league PA under his belt, and center field is wide open. Sure he may not be as talented as Brantley, that’s not the point. There are only so many at-bats to go around and a line of young players in need of an extended look. Crowe deserves this opportunity more than Brantley, in my opinion.

Under normal circumstances, Acta views the switch-hitting Crowe as an ideal fourth outfielder, able to provide excellent defense and speed off the bench. Instead, he’s been anointed the leadoff hitter and everyday center fielder. Crowe has responded to the organization’s vote of confidence in a big way, with a slash line of .324/.390/.432 with 12 H, 4 BB, and 3 SB in his first 9 games (41 PA) entering Monday’s series against Chicago. The 26-year-old Crowe is currently outperforming his career line of .276/.354/.407 at Triple-A. Combined with a .355 BABIP, Crowe is probably playing over his head right now. As long as he’s hitting though, that leadoff spot is his.

It’s not like the team has any clear cut leadoff hitters anyway. Grudzielanek? Donald? Choo is far-and-away the best available hitter, but someone has to drive in the runs. Plus, it would be a waste to have Choo’s power batting leadoff. Instead, Acta has tapped Choo to continue his noble “bat Sizemore second” experiment (a brilliant move I’ll continue to defend, if only Sizemore had hit…). Choo’s response? Two taters in three games, so far.

Proposed Cleveland Lineup

Order	Starter (sub)	GS (PA)	wOBA^	ISO	WAR
1	T. Crowe#	8 (41)	.375	.108	0.4
2	S. Choo*	42 (190)	.405	.176	2.1
3	J. Peralta	39 (167)	.323	.160	0.2
4	T. Hafner*	37 (160)	.363	.145	0.7
5	A. Kearns	29 (130)	.383	.183	1.1
6	R. Branyan*	19 (84)	.319	.219	0.3
7	M. Grudzielanek	20 (95)	.283	.000	0.2
8	L. Marson	29 (106)	.247	.042	-0.1
9	J. Donald	6 (23)	.148	.000	-0.2

	(M. LaPorta)	24 (106)	.249	.061	-0.5
	(L. Valbuena*)	25 (102)	.250	.107	-0.4
	(M. Redmond)	13 (49)	.269	.091	-0.2
DL	(A. Marte)	8 (32)	.338	.208	0.1
DL	G. Sizemore*	31 (140)	.255	.078	-0.4
DL	A. Cabrera#	33 (149)	.303	.081	-0.1

*Lefty; #Switch

^League average is roughly .335

Stats courtesy of FanGraphs, current as of 5/24/10

The rest of the lineup that’s been trotted out for the past 9 games has been fairly conventional. Speed at the top, power in the middle, light weights and scrubs at the bottom. The speedy Jason Donald is sort of the “second” leadoff man batting ninth, similar to how Brantley was deployed at the start of the season. Meanwhile, Peralta really shouldn’t be batting lower than fourth now that he’s broken out of his usual April doldrums (this opinion subject to change in 30 days).

The bottom half of the lineup is almost a throw-away with Grudzielanek setting the table for the punch-less LaPorta and Marson. The heart of the order isn’t too bad though, assuming Hafner’s bat continues to come around, Kearns doesn’t become a black hole when the inevitable regression hits (.421 BABIP!), and Branyan does….well, I guess the home runs are nice. I’m pretty comfortable with a lineup starting off with [Hot Hand of the Month], Choo, Peralta, Hafner, Kearns, and Branyan. You know, considering the circumstances. Cleveland’s lineup isn’t about to send Francisco Liriano running for the hills, but it might make Luke Hochevar break a sweat (those complete games are hard work).

Again, the lineup doesn’t really matter much in the long run. Acta might be able to eke out some extra runs by shuffling the batting order and playing the splits, but consistency and playing time are the name of the game for a young ball club trying to get its act together. Not to mention, the makeup of the offense could be in line for a dramatic overhaul once Carlos Santana comes to town. Remember what a difference it made when Victor Martinez went down with an injury in 2008? Ok, maybe you don’t because Kelly Shoppach had a career year and belted 21 homers as a catcher. Still, it’s going to be a big deal when Santana arrives in June.

Quotable Acta

When asked whether it's tough to get reliever Rafael Perez enough work in non-pressure situations:

"Life is tough. Get a helmet."

When asked about the loss of his number 1 and 2 hitters a week later:

“Life is tough, get a double-flap helmet. It provides more protection from both sides.”

Tribe Loses Cabrera in a Botched Shift

2010-05-18T12:58:00.003-05:00

Asdrubal Cabrera has to be one of the unluckiest players in Cleveland history, which is saying something given the crappy luck that franchise has had. In a collision that turned out to be much worse than it looked, Cabrera fractured his left forearm in the first inning of Monday’s game at Tampa Bay.

A shift was on for Hank Blalock, moving Jhonny Peralta to the shortstop position and Cabrera over to the first base side. Blalock hit a ground ball about a foot left of the bag, directly between the two infielders. Running at full speed to make a play on the ball, neither player appears to see each other until it’s too late. In an attempt to slow down at the last second, Peralta slides into and on top of Cabrera, placing Cabrera’s arm in an awkward position underneath his torso and causing the fractured bone.

I was ready to place the blame on Peralta for the incident (which I’m sure was the knee-jerk reaction for a lot of fans), but upon further review, there really wasn’t anything Peralta could have done to avoid the collision once the play began. Below is a series of screenshots showing the play in question:

Normally, if Peralta and Cabrera were converging on a ball, their routes would overlap with one backing up the other. Because of the shift and the direction the ball took towards second base, their ranges overlapped.

Here, you can see Peralta and Cabrera converging on the ball at nearly the same time. Both are focused on the ball and getting ready to make a play and fail to notice the other player bearing down on them.

After watching the replay several times, I think this is the point where the play broke down and turned dangerous. Some may blame Peralta’s inability to get out of the way in time or point out that the shortstop should have received priority on the play, but the collision resulted from a lack of communication and the departure of the standard infield procedures. This is partly due to the unusual circumstances presented by the shift.

To my knowledge, infielders don’t typically call out for a ground ball, it just reverts to whoever is closest to the area of play at the time. An initial verbal cue could have prevented the collision, though such an act is far from second nature for a ground ball up the middle. Cabrera may have been a few steps closer to where the ball rolled through, but it was very close; arguably too close for the players to reasonably judge in the middle of a quick play like that. However, they did have an opportunity to either discuss the shift with each other or note where people were positioned prior to that first pitch to Blalock. It’s unclear whether this actually happened or not.

Both players are still looking over their shoulder at the ball and not paying attention to each other. Peralta seems to be taking a route slightly behind Cabrera.

At this point, Peralta notices Cabrera diving towards him at an angle to cut off the ball and he attempts to put on the brakes. Keep in mind that they are both going at full tilt right now.

Peralta tries to skid to a halt on his knee, but his momentum continues to carry him…

...until he briefly rolls over Cabrera. It appears that Peralta was able to avoid dropping his full weight onto Cabrera, propping himself up with his knee. Unfortunately, Cabrera’s arm is trapped between the ground and the point where Peralta’s weight does land, which places too much stress on the bone and fractures it.

Again, I feel that blame for the collision lies with both players, even though Cabrera took the hit. There are measures each player could have taken collaboratively or on his own to prevent the accident, yet presumably failed to do so. The severity of Cabrera’s injury still seems like a fluke to me though. If I had watched the replay without knowing the aftermath, I would have been surprised to hear it caused a broken arm. There just didn’t seem to be enough contact or force involved.

That said, I feel absolutely terrible for Cabrera. He had begun to establish himself as a key member of the team as starting shortstop and leadoff hitter this season, only to have it derailed early on. Last season, Cabrera missed nearly a month after dislocating his shoulder while sliding into second to break up a double play. Both were fairly routine plays that for whatever reason, ended in a serious injury.

Is Cabrera at risk of developing into one of those brilliant, yet fragile players during his career? Even though he was a starter for all of 2009, Cabrera was only healthy enough to appear in 131 games that year. Over the course of the 2009 season, he suffered a hip strain, ankle injury (running out to his position between innings), knee contusion (fouled off a ball), the dislocated shoulder, and had surgery to remove loose bodies in his elbow after the season. So far in 2010, he’s had a strained groin in spring training, a quad strain, and the broken arm. All those little injuries are seemingly starting to pile up for the 24-year-old shortstop.

I think it’s still too early to write off Cabrera as a chronic injury risk, partly due to his age and the unavoidable or routine nature of some of the injuries. Plus, a major item was overlooked in the list above: how much time was actually missed from these injuries. It may be a lengthy list compared to some players, but it’s not nearly as bad as it seems. Twenty five of the games he missed in 2009 resulted solely from the dislocated shoulder. Had he not collided with the infielder’s leg on that play, Cabrera would have appeared in at least 156 games (that’s over 96% of the season). If that were the case, I wouldn’t have given his injury history a second thought.

Luis and the Lefties

2010-05-01T23:48:00.007-05:00

Cleveland has had a tough time finding that “second baseman of the future” ever since they shipped out Brandon Phillips in 2006. Since then, second has been occupied by Josh Barfield and various veteran journeymen. Ronnie Belliard’s tenure, from 2004 until he was traded to St. Louis late in 2006, was the longest of the bunch. Belliard also posted two of the best offensive seasons (106, 107 OPS+) by a Cleveland second baseman since Roberto Alomar in 2001 (150 OPS+), so clearly it’s been a while since the franchise had a capable hitter manning the pivot.

This makes a player like Luis Valbuena all the more intriguing. Valbuena was acquired from Seattle (along with Joe Smith via the Mets) during the 2008 offseason in exchange for Franklin Gutierrez. Even though Cleveland essentially pulled a Brian Giles with the Gutierrez trade (stud outfielder traded so he wouldn’t be blocked by a studlier outfielder at his natural position), the expectations within the organization and amongst the fans (at least those who valued cost-controlled, elite defenders in center field) were already slightly elevated. The fact that the Barfield trade ended up as a huge disappointment also shadowed Valbuena’s arrival.

Despite a rushed development track with Seattle, the 22-year-old Valbuena more than held his own in the upper minors, splitting the 2008 season between Double and Triple-A. After posting a combined .303/.382/.431 line over 523 PA that year, Cleveland promoted him full time to Triple-A, where he continued to thrive at the plate with a .321/.436/.538 line over 95 PA. Valbuena made his debut in Cleveland in May of 2009 and proceeded to take his lumps against major league pitching for the remainder of the season. The Tribe had wanted to determine if he could be a viable starter as the team shifted into rebuilding mode and expressed optimism in the relatively raw Valbuena’s .714 OPS that season.

Valbuena received a vote of confidence from new manager Manny Acta during spring training this offseason when Acta addressed the topic no young position player wants to be associated with:

We're not in the business of developing platoon players at 24 years old. We're going to give him opportunities [against lefties].

From a developmental stand-point, this was the right approach to take with Valbuena. Common sense dictates that he’ll never figure out lefties if he doesn’t get a chance to face them on a regular basis. However, there have been rumblings that Acta may be hedging somewhat on his original promise. Below are the season splits for Valbuena and his backup, Mark Grudzielanek, through May 1:

Valbuena

Split	GS	PA	2B	HR	BB	OBP	SLG	OPS	BABIP
Total	16	65	2	2	9	.308	.327	.635	.216
vs RHP	14	55	2	1	7	.291	.277	.568	.219
vs LHP	2	10	0	1	2	.400	.625	1.025	.200

Grudzielanek

Split	GS	PA	2B	HR	BB	OBP	SLG	OPS	BABIP
Total	7	30	0	0	0	.233	.233	.467	.269
vs RHP	2	9	0	0	0	.222	.222	.444	.250
vs LHP	5	21	0	0	0	.238	.238	.476	.278

It may be a limited sample, but considering five of Grudzielanek’s seven starts have come against LH starting pitchers (all of which were at 2B) while only two of Valbuena’s sixteen have come against lefty starters, there appears to be a trend forming. It’s too early to draw any useful conclusions performance-wise, but it is curious that Valbuena’s 10 PA against lefties this season have been outstanding while Grudzielanek’s contributions in that department have been poor.

Acta may be trying to help Valbuena break out of his early slump by putting him in ideal situations for success and will end the platoon once Valbuena gets his overall numbers up. Acta may also be feeling the pressure of managing an under-performing offense and has opted to temporarily shelve his plan for Valbuena in an effort to get some extra production from second base.

If that’s the case, it’s not working. Grudzielanek has been a dog at the plate so far, even worse than Valbuena’s overall numbers. So why not just give the kid the at-bats he was promised? Acta has the green light to test his young players this season and has suggested he’ll take advantage of that opportunity, making any talk of platoons seem out of place right now.

Is it possible Acta is just ahead of the curve on Valbuena though? After all, the main contradiction between what Acta originally stated and the direction he may be taking now was based on a spring training sound bite, so the anti-platoon policy for second isn’t exactly iron clad. Valbuena’s career minor league splits are a bit discouraging. Below are his career totals and a sample of his time in the upper minors:

Year	Age	Level	Split	AB	HR	OBP	SLG	OPS	BABIP	LD%
2008	22	AA	vs RHP	170	8	.374	.524	.898	.326	18.50%
			vs LHP	70	1	.398	.386	.784	.339	22.20%

		AAA	vs RHP	161	2	.395	.391	.786	.348	17.70%
			vs LHP	48	0	.327	.292	.619	.325	16.70%

2009	23	AAA	vs RHP	59	3	.471	.661	1.132	.396	27.50%
			vs LHP	19	0	.304	.158	.462	.214	13.3%

Career		Minors	vs RHP	1289	37	.361	.447	.808	.306	13.9%
			vs LHP	460	5	.319	.311	.630	.290	14.60%

Career		MLB	vs RHP	418	9	.293	.463	.756	.270	20.6%
			vs LHP	58	3	.302	.390	.692	.292	19.40%

Valbuena’s second stint in Double-A in 2007 also happens to be his best overall season in the minors. Considering he put up a better OBP against lefties than righties for the first time since A+ ball accompanied by an elevated BABIP (.339 versus a career .302), this stretch is probably more of an outlier. After being promoted to Triple-A, Valbuena’s numbers against lefties dropped off considerably and haven’t shown much sign of rebounding.

His career minor league splits reinforce this trend with a .630 OPS over 460 AB against lefties compared to a much healthier .808 OPS over 1289 AB against righties. Not only has Valbuena struggled to get on base against southpaws (.319 OBP), but his bat loses most of its pop (.311 SLG).

With that kind of track record, it’s quite possible that Valbuena never figures out how to handle lefties effectively. If he failed to do so against lesser competition throughout his minor league career, the odds don’t look good, even if he were to receive regular at-bats against them in the majors. However, the main factor working in the 24-year-old's favor at the moment is that he was rushed through the minors and is still relatively young for a major league starter, so he could still develop into a serviceable hitter against lefties down the road.

The team should maintain a patient approach with Valbuena. Regardless of what he does against lefties, it’s well established that he has the potential to be an above average hitter versus righties (which is what he’ll be facing most of the time anyway). Also, considering Valbuena’s home is second base, it’s not like he’s expected to be an integral part of the offense, nor is he blocking any superior hitters down on the farm.

A lot of players tend to have difficulty against left handed pitching during their career. For example, fellow lefty Grady Sizemore has a modest career OPS of .705 against left handed pitching, which casts Valbuena's career mark of .630 in the minors in a better light considering the disparity in talent between the two players.

Given how ineffective guys like Sizemore, Peralta, and Hafner have been early in the season, it would seem unfair to single out Valbuena’s slump. If management does decide to shake things up at second base though, Jason Donald is making quite a case for himself in Columbus with 8 doubles, 2 HR, and a .321/.424/.912 line over 84 AB so far. Donald can also play every infield position except first, meaning incumbent utility infielder Grudzielanek should start looking over his shoulder as well.

Coincidentally, Donald owns a career minor league line of .279/.391/.423 against left handed pitching, making him an ideal platoon partner for Valbuena if that’s the direction the team decides to go in. Cleveland would have to move Grudzielanek before promoting Donald, but that appears to be the best option if Grudzielanek fails to produce at the plate.

Having both Valbuena and Donald up gives Manny Acta more options as far as developing his future roster while optimizing his current one. Even if the team “is not in the business of developing 24 year old platoon players,” at least they’d be able to get a look at their two best options at second base in the same season, possibly improving the offense in the process if they end up as a pure platoon.

Book Review: Evaluating Baseball's Managers by Chris Jaffe

2010-01-12T23:29:00.000-05:00

I was recently contacted by baseball writer Chris Jaffe to review a set of excerpts from his new book, "Evaluating Baseball's Managers: A History and Analysis of Performance in the Major Leagues, 1876-2008." I’ve never posted a book review before, but I had enjoyed some of the author’s earlier articles on major league managers for The Hardball Times, so the topic caught my interest right away.

I think this is a great concept for a book given that managers tend to be one of the most overlooked elements of a team. Despite all the statistical advances in evaluating player and team performance, the manager’s influence has always been difficult to measure. What role do a manager’s actions actually play in deciding a team’s win-loss record? Jaffe’s book takes a fresh approach to answering this question and lays a solid foundation for future research on the impact of managerial decisions.

The first part of the book explains the metrics upon which its conclusions are based and provides results illustrating who the best, worst, and most extreme managers in history are. Jaffe utilizes the Birnbaum Database (based on expected win-loss records and run differential algorithms) and Tendencies Database (based on how teams rank in certain categories, like bunts), in addition to other supporting stats, to create the core metrics for comparing managers in relation to their team’s performance. The databases also provide a baseline with which to compare managers against each other, distilling their abilities (or lack thereof) into tangible results.

The second half of the book contains entries on 89 managers spanning 132 years of baseball history, including 77 managers who served at least 10 seasons as a team’s primary manager and 12 of the most significant who fell short of this criterion. Additional background on the book is available here, for those who are curious.

I had access to the entries for 13 former Cleveland managers, from Patsy Tebeau (1892-98) to Mike Hargrove (1992-99), which gave me a good sample to consider.

My favorite part of the excerpts was how seamlessly Jaffe integrated the history in with the analysis for each manager. Historical context can play an important role in understanding a manager’s tendencies (the use of starting pitchers now and in the past is a prime example), while also adding depth to an entry. Famous events, characters, and trivia from baseball’s history populate each entry, making the book as much a history lesson as an analytical tool.

Obviously, some managers received more detailed entries than others, but I never felt like any of them were being shorted (length was appropriate to influence). It also didn’t show any bias towards the big name managers; for every Lou Boudreau, you’ll find someone like Steve O’Neill who is described in just as much detail and is just as fascinating.

Each manager’s Team Characteristics write-up is prefaced with a summary of their career record/timeline and database results. The data is depicted on the basis of runs scored/prevented and was easy enough to understand. Basically, if you can read an adjusted stat like OPS+, you won’t have any trouble understanding the stats presented in the book. By comparing the Team Characteristics section to a manager’s effectiveness scores from the Birnbaum database, the reader can immediately make a connection as to whether or not a manager’s methods proved effective or not.

Based on the brief explanation I read, Jaffe seems to have a strong methodology in place for generating and evaluating the statistics he uses from all angles, going so far as to highlight possible errors or shortcomings that may be influencing the data and offering an appropriate explanation or caveat to accompany the data.

Occasionally, an individual manager’s entry will highlight a particular trend or unique record, weaving in other managers who share the same thread. I particularly enjoyed these nuggets of analysis, since they actually backed up the previously stated tendencies with results and could connect historical trends experienced by other managers. Below is a sample of analysis for Al Lopez (1951-56) pertaining to his starting rotation:

Lopez, unlike other AL skippers, noted the weather and temperature when deciding how much he should lean on his starting pitchers. The below chart notes what percentage of starts resulted in completion for the White Sox from 1957-65 (when Lopez managed them) in comparison to the rest of the league:

Month	CWS	Other AL
April	25.7%	26.2%
May	25.3%	26.4%
June	28.0%	25.6%
July	28.4%	26.1%
Aug.	34.7%	27.1%
S/O	24.6%	27.7%

This list reveals that the rest of the league’s pitchers started games on a regular basis throughout the season, but Lopez’s White Sox were less likely to finish games in the colder months. This looks like sensible player management on Lopez’s part. The colder the weather, the harder it is for the muscles to warm up (this is especially true after sitting down for a half-inning). An arm that was not fully warmed up risked a greater chance of injury or at least ineffectiveness. By maintaining an awareness of when to push or ease up on his players, Lopez’s squads could thrive instead of wilt as the year went on.

I’ve become so accustomed to the way the game is managed today, it’s fun to look back at how the game used to be. I’d also never even heard of most of the old-time mangers and wouldn’t have known how influential some of them were on the franchise from just glancing at the numbers on their Baseball Reference page. Jaffe’s book helps define part of a franchise’s history that fans wouldn’t otherwise be exposed to.

Even better, is reading about managers that you’ve actually seen in action and are able to pair your own opinion and experiences with. Reading about popular contemporary managers in this context puts them in a whole other light as far as whether they actually deserve the reputation and accolades they’ve received in their careers. So for all the fans who are tired of hearing about the genius of Tony LaRussa or how overrated Joe Torre is, now you have a tool at your disposal that can help separate fact from fiction.

I would recommend this book to any baseball fan with an interest in history or the latest statistical analysis (honestly, it could stand alone in either category). "Evaluating Baseball's Managers" is available for purchase here.

Cleveland May Skip Weak Free Agent Market

2009-12-09T20:56:00.001-05:00

With the annual GM Winter Meetings starting on Monday in Indianapolis, there will be a flurry of activity surrounding the free agent market. Obviously, the rebuilding Indians aren’t going to be spending much money on free agents this off-season, but that didn’t stop new manager Manny Acta from dropping a few hints about what he wants for Christmas.

According to an interview on Castrovince’s blog, Acta was open to the possibility of bringing in a veteran starting pitcher (because “you can never go into Spring Training short on pitching”), a right-handed utility infielder to cover first base (in case LaPorta is still ailing in April), and possibly a veteran starting catcher (in case the rookie backstops are overwhelmed in managing the pitching staff). I’m not sure I agree with Acta’s assessment, but to be fair this was meant as an “ideal” scenario as far as what holes he would fill to bolster his young team in the short-term.

Representing the front office’s point of view heading to Indy, Shapiro gave the impression that he won’t even be shopping for his usual bargain bin signings this year:

"We don't have a defined need. We want to get better and improve and offset the volatility that goes with young players, but we don't have the pressure of having to complete a trade or sign a free agent."

That “volatility” associated with the team’s young players is basically another way of saying “we’re not totally sold on these guys to carry the team next season.” The level of confidence the front office has in players like Andy Marte, Jordan Brown, and Carlos Carrasco will be a key point in dictating how aggressive Cleveland is on the free agent market (the pitching staff seems to be garnering the most buzz in this regard). Jake Westbrook’s performance with Ponce of the Puerto Rican winter league may also influence how inclined the team is to pursue a veteran starting pitcher to help stabilize a comparatively inexperienced rotation.

It may seem odd to hear Acta casually mention adding a veteran starter when the team already has a healthy Westbrook on track for Spring Training. I’m pretty confident that Cleveland will be shopping Westbrook this season though, which would leave a significant void in the rotation. Westbrook is owed $11 million in 2010, so there will probably be some pressure from ownership to move his contract. Right now, it’s a matter of timing.

Cleveland may know Westbrook is healthy, but it would be wise to showcase him against major league competition to further boost his trade value. Barring any setbacks, I’d place Westbrook’s return value maybe a notch or two above Pavano (which yielded pitcher Yohan Pino from the Twins). The fact that Pavano was due only about $1.5 million and Westbrook will be guaranteed significantly more than that could make him less appealing as a stop-gap acquisition for a contender. Then again, Westbrook is a better pitcher than Pavano to begin with and has been known to go on ridiculous hot streaks, so concerns over his price tag may be dampened heading into the mid-season trade deadline.

Either way, it’s doubtful Westbrook is moved this winter due to his recent health issues and lack of major league innings. Interest in Jake will probably start to gain steam as the season matures and contenders start to contemplate holes in their rotations.

Even if Cleveland decides to pursue a pitcher, are there even any veteran hurlers on the market worth signing? Guys like Jarrod Washburn, Rich Harden, Vicente Padilla, Justin Duchscherer, and Jon Garland are beyond the Tribe’s price range. John Smoltz and Pedro Martinez are interesting options, but it would be to their advantage to stay in the National League and their endurance makes them a poor fit for a team that would be looking for innings to lessen the workload of their developing arms. Plus, Pedro may command a decent raise with his performance in the playoffs for Philly last year.

As intriguing as it would be to have a veteran like Smoltz or Martinez mentoring the pitchers, isn’t that what the coaching staff is for? If they sign a free agent who is only available to pitch half the time (or less) because of durability issues, they’d essentially be paying $2-5 million for a part-time player and an extra coach. This doesn’t seem like an especially wise use of a roster spot or what limited funds are available to improve the team.

Granted, there is a different dynamic involved when comparing a player-coach and player-player relationship. There could certainly be some aspects to the latter teaching arrangement that I am undervaluing or are non-occurring between a player and a formal coach. Still, now doesn’t seem like an appropriate time to bring in that type of player given the team’s financial struggles and abundance of available arms.

Also, it’s not as if the rotation would consist of a bunch of fresh-faced rookies right out of the gate. Laffey (264.2 IP) and Masterson (217.2 IP) have been up long enough to understand the game and what’s expected of them at this level, even making an appearance in the postseason. Huff spent much of 2009 in Cleveland and appears to be ML ready. With 395 and 498 innings logged in the Majors over four seasons, Sowers and Carmona are well-seasoned, despite their individual struggles (I’m carrying over my prediction from last year: if Carmona doesn’t get it together the pitching staff is in big trouble regardless). Carlos Carrasco and Hector Rondon are another story, but again, their development track ultimately falls to the coaching staff.

The team will have some juggling to do in managing their starters. Carmona is a lock for the rotation, although Sowers’ role is less certain; both are out of minor league options. Masterson offers some flexibility in that he can move back to the bullpen, but I think the organization has a strong desire to test him as a starter for now. If that’s the case, Sowers may be used as a long-reliever. This could yield more work than you’d think, especially if Carmona or others have trouble going deep into games or the team wants to manage the workload of certain pitchers.

Carrasco will likely start the season in Columbus as an emergency starter or whenever Westbrook’s rotation spot opens up via trade. Due to a lack of experience in the upper minors and service time considerations, I’d be surprised if Rondon was called up before the second half of the season.

And in case you were wondering, Anthony Reyes will likely miss the entire 2010 season as he recovers from ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction surgery, so he’s a non-factor. Scott Lewis (remember him?) spent most of 2009 trying to get healthy in the minors, but could contribute at some point in 2010 (no idea when or in what capacity though).

Below is how I see the Indians’ rotation shaking out to start the season:

1.) Westbrook

2.) Carmona

3.) Laffey*

4.) Masterson

5.) Huff*

6.) Sowers* (bullpen/emergency starter)

7.) Carrasco (Triple-A)

* Left-hander

There are always a few surprises when it comes to distributing starts over a season, which means players in Columbus like Chuck Lofgren, Yohan Pino, or Zach Jackson could enter the fray at some point. For an example of this unpredictability, see Tomo Ohka’s six starts with the Tribe in 2009.

Returning to the question of a free agent signing, does Cleveland have enough starting pitching depth to make it through the season without over-exposing their prospects? This is literally the (multi) million dollar question for Cleveland. It’s not an easy question to answer, especially if you factor in the possible departure of Westbrook. On the one hand, there just aren’t many quality, affordable starters on the market. On the other, the team will only need that additional starter in the event of an unlikely string of injuries or a drastic failure in performance by multiple pitchers, paired with a trade that may or may not occur (plus there always seems to be a journeyman available on waivers to eat innings).

Assuming Cleveland has around $5 million to work with (based on what I’ve heard, this could be a generous guess), wants a veteran presence, and doesn’t want to commit to more than a one year deal, who’s available this off-season?

Bartolo Colon

Colon fell off the radar following his 2005 CY-winning season with Anaheim. He suffered a torn rotator cuff in the 2005 postseason and was limited by shoulder soreness and trips to the DL for much of the ’06 and ’07 seasons. Colon found some success in 2008 on a minor league deal with Boston, averaging 5.57 innings over 7 starts with a 118 ERA+, 1.38 WHIP, and 2.70 K/BB ratio. He signed a $1 million contract with the White Sox in 2009, making 12 starts over 62.1 IP (5.17 IP/GS) with a 111 ERA+, 1.44 WHIP, and 1.81 K/BB. It’s unclear how much injury hindered his 2009 season, but Colon’s decision to withhold an inflamed elbow from the team contributed to his release in September.

Assuming he hasn’t held a grudge about being traded to Montreal and still has a strong desire to pitch, a return to Cleveland could do wonders for his focus. Cleveland’s training staff is also among the best in the league and may keep him healthier than he’s been in the past. His endurance is questionable, but when healthy the 36-year-old has been able to provide quality innings and appears to have enough left in the tank to be a serviceable fifth starter. Colon could be worth taking a flyer on as there would be minimal risk involved in a minor league deal. I’d consider him more of a depth signing than a true starter though.

Livan Hernandez

You want an innings eater, this is the guy (just don’t expect anything special). Livan Hernandez has been adding to his journeyman status the last four seasons, bouncing between Washington, Arizona, Minnesota, Colorado, the Mets, and back to Washington. During that time, the 34-year-old righty has averaged nearly 200 innings per season, which is sort of remarkable considering what he’s tossing out there on a given night.

Considering the Mets and Nationals ranked near the bottom of the league on defense last year, Hernandez really wasn’t that bad. Over 31 starts he posted a 4.44 FIP, 1.56 WHIP, 1.52 K/BB, and 1.10 GB/FB over 183.2 IP. Ok, so he does allow a ton of baserunners and the 22.3% line drive rate is a bit steep, but hey: that’s 180 fewer innings you don’t have to worry about distributing amongst the youthful rotation or an assuredly busy bullpen (quantity over quality in this case).

Unless the Indians can come away with some sort of coup elsewhere, Hernandez is probably my favorite candidate to play the role of veteran starter/innings eater/insurance policy for the rotation. The Mets picked him up on a minor league deal last February with a base salary of $1 million, plus some modest performance incentives. It seems reasonable for Hernandez to look for a similar deal this year, although he may not be thrilled at the prospect of another minor league stint.

I think Cleveland holds an advantage over most teams in this case, since they could essentially guarantee Hernandez the type of playing time others can’t (although other non-contenders could also provide ample innings, so this may not be that strong of a bargaining chip). If the organization feels this is the best safety net for the rotation in 2010, it would be realistic for them to flip Westbrook’s salary at some point while bringing in Hernandez on a one-year, $1-2.5 million deal.

Kelvim Escobar

Escobar had to have his right shoulder surgically repaired prior to the 2008 season and he’s been trying to get healthy ever since. Escobar’s comeback trail has been littered with various aches and pains, forcing him into a prolonged rehab period that stretched into the entire 2009 season. After sitting out all of 2008, he made his only major league appearance of 2009 in a June 6^th start, but simply didn’t have enough strength in his shoulder to continue pitching. As he approaches the two year mark since his surgery, Escobar plans on showcasing his arm in the Venezuelan Winter League this winter and may work out for individual teams in January (according to Jerry Crasnick at ESPN).

The fact that Escobar is advertising his participation in winter ball indicates that he is fairly confident in his health this time around. However, it is unclear if he can still be an effective starting pitcher, as his velocity and endurance have likely taken a significant hit due to the severity of his injury. It may also take time for him to re-adjust to pitching in the majors and become comfortable working in the strike zone again. This re-adjustment could be difficult if he suddenly finds himself without his 94 mph fastball (I’m not sure if he’s been able to further integrate and improve his off-speed pitches in the meantime).

Escobar may ultimately end up as a reliever to help preserve his fragile shoulder. Angels manager Mike Scioscia entertained the idea of shifting Escobar to the pen before having to shut him down completely in 2009. It would make sense for both parties to have Escobar spend a large portion of 2010 as a reliever. This would reduce the risk involved for whoever signs him, since he would be cheaper and easier to replace if he were to land on the DL. It would also benefit Escobar, since a back-end bullpen gig would provide a low-pressure environment against major league competition in which to test his shoulder and get acclimated.

The Red Sox, Rays, Orioles, Yankees, Mets, Mariners, and Brewers have all been connected to Escobar through the rumor mill, so there would be plenty of competition for his services if Cleveland decided to enter the mix. All of those teams, minus the Rays, could probably offer a more lucrative contract than Cleveland, not to mention a chance to play for a contender (Orioles excluded).

Cleveland could certainly offer an incentivized minor league deal, but the salary ceiling for those incentives would fall short of the field. The Tribe’s lack of disposable funds should keep them on the sidelines, but Escobar isn’t exactly worth pursuing anyway as he does not meet the team’s needs at this stage of his career.

Ben Sheets

I had been casually mulling the idea of Cleveland bringing in Ben Sheets on a Pavano-Plus type of contract: a low base salary of $1.5-3 million, but with a higher salary ceiling and better incentives contingent on innings pitched and time spent on the DL. Even if the only way Sheets would sign is if he had the chance to make $6-8 million after incentives, Cleveland could still ship him to a contender for a prospect or cash at the trade deadline if he stays healthy and pitches like the Ben Sheets of old. It sounded like a good idea, until I heard how much Sheets is looking for in his next contract.

$12 million guaranteed, if the report is to be believed. I understand his agent is trying to get a good deal for his client, but considering Sheets had surgery on a torn flexor tendon in his right elbow last February it’s sort of amusing to see that kind of figure suggested. The only way Sheets is going to come close to that amount is if he signs a heavily incentivized contract and stays healthy enough to meet all his performance goals. No team is going to give him $12 million up front; something had to have gotten lost in translation here.

At any rate, the 31-year-old Louisiana native has not made a major league start since September of 2008 before the elbow injury cost him a chance to make his first career post-season start. Sheets was fairly impressive en route to a 3.38 FIP, 1.15 WHIP, and 3.36 K/BB over 198.1 IP (31 GS). If he can replicate those numbers, he’d certainly be worth $12 million on the market, but given his injury history (past and present) that’s a big “if.” Word on the street is that several teams are interested in his services, with the Rangers appearing to be the front runners (they made an attempt to sign him in 2008 before the seriousness of his injury came out). The Yankees, Mets, and Orioles have also been connected to the right-hander.

Obviously, the anticipated price tag alone (incentives or not) will discourage Cleveland from getting too involved with Sheets, but he presents an intriguing risk/reward value for teams better equipped to absorb the salary hit if he ends up collecting a large chunk of his contract before succumbing to injury and becoming untradeable (assuming he makes it out of the starting gate). If Cleveland had a legitimate chance to contend, I’d advocate pursuing Sheets on a team-friendly contract given his potential upside when healthy. Heck, even if they weren’t going to contend, but still had the cash, I wouldn’t mind seeing them take a chance on turning Sheets into a prime trade chip.

A weak free agent class and Cleveland’s lack of financial muscle makes it seem unlikely that they will be signing any free agents to major league contracts this winter. Fortunately, the organization’s revamped farm system contains enough depth to make free agents a luxury, as they arguably have enough pieces on their current roster to field a decent team in 2010 while they further develop their key prospects. While it is unusual for a team to completely forego the free agent market, the money saved on a weak talent pool could yield a better value in the future.

More on Manny and His D.C. Rep

2009-10-29T23:21:00.003-05:00

Manny Acta was introduced as Cleveland’s new manager at a press conference with Mark Shapiro on Monday. The conference started off with the usual Shapiro Speak™ before Acta donned the ceremonial press conference jersey and took some questions. Nothing ground breaking of course, but there were a few interesting items to chew on.

One of the first things I noticed about Acta was how passionate he sounds when talking about baseball and his new team. He’s either one of the best PR men Cleveland has seen in a while, or he really does take tremendous pride in his profession (I’d say a combination of both, particularly the latter). I’m probably over-hyping the man at this point, but even if he is still just drawing from his interview playbook, the fact that he cared enough about joining the team to completely immerse himself in the organization’s structure, players, achievements, and failures from top-to-bottom means a lot. And remember, he chose Cleveland over Houston, an organization he has an amicable history with.

This seems like more than just a second chance to prove himself as a manager, Acta seems like he truly wants to be here and see these players (most of whom he’s probably never even met) succeed and develop. That’s a very cool vibe to get from a manager’s second press conference.

Early on, Acta implied that he at least has a basic understanding of the dynamic behind the fan base in Cleveland, contrasting the 455 straight sellouts of the last Golden Age of Baseball on the North Coast with the absence of a championship. Having spent time in Montreal and Washington, he probably knows it’s going to be an uphill battle to win back the fan base, which is indirectly part of his job. The sooner he can start fielding a contender again, the sooner the fans will (hopefully) start showing the support they used to and rally around the team.

Apparently, Acta had come to respect and know the Indians organization through a few atypical channels. As a NL manager, Acta only had the chance to meet the Tribe on the field once during interleague play in 2007. However, he did become quite familiar with the organization during his time coaching and managing in the minors. As an opposing manager, Acta said he “battled [the Indians] organization for years in the minor leagues.” That was sort of an interesting anecdote for him to bring up now, considering he hasn’t even been in the minors since 2000.

He also described how he watched the Indians on television after he was fired from the Nationals, knowing an opportunity may emerge within the struggling franchise. "[Cleveland] is a place where a lot of people want to be,” said Acta. “In 2007, I worked as an analyst during the playoffs [for FOX Sports en Español (FSE)] and fell in love with the Indians back then."

Acta went on to show his familiarity with the players he’ll be taking on, briefly mentioning how his staff will need to get Carmona back on track in 2010 and how David Huff turned out a successful rookie season (probably not a stretch to pencil Huff into Acta’s starting rotation next year). He even dropped Hector Rondon’s name into the conversation (foreshadowing a mid-season call-up perhaps?).

The main piece of news to come out of the press conference was that some of the coaches Acta is interested in hiring to fill out his staff are still under contract with other teams, meaning he couldn’t discuss any specific names just yet. My take-away from that would be that Acta has been given the lead in assembling his coaching staff, rather than having to work off a pre-determined list of candidates provided by the front office (although obviously Shapiro and Dolan will have to sign off on any final decisions).

The new coaches will probably be announced soon after the World Series, assuming the team is already beginning to contact potential hires.

For the second time, Acta cited Joe Torre as an example of how even the most respected managers in baseball were challenged early in their career. “If you give people the opportunity to choose between, say, Joe Torre after his first three years with the Mets or the Joe Torre now, I believe everyone would pick the one from now," Acta said. "I think we have to look back and know that not everybody who is a big shot now was a big shot when they started. I think big shots are just little shots who keep shooting, and I'm not willing to quit shooting until I become a big shot."

This statement was directed towards the skeptics who have expressed concern over his tenure with the Washington Nationals. Over two and half seasons with the Nationals, Acta compiled a .385 win percentage. Considering what he had to work with in D.C. though, is it really fair to pin those losing seasons on Acta? Below are the first four managerial seasons for three of the league’s current “big shots:”

Name	Age	Team	Season	Record	W-L%	Finish
B. Cox	37	Braves	1978	69-93	.426	6
	38		1979	66-94	.413	6
	39		1980	81-80	.503	4
	40		1981	50-56	.463	5

J. Torre	37	Mets	1977	49-68	.419	6
	38		1978	66-96	.407	6
	39		1979	63-99	.389	6
	40		1980	67-95	.414	5

T. Francona	38	Phillies	1997	68-94	.420	5
	39		1998	75-87	.463	3
	40		1999	77-85	.475	3
	41		2000	65-97	.401	5

This is only a small sample of three successful managers, but I think it gets the point across. With the exception of Bobby Cox in 1980, none of the three compiled a winning season in their first four years on the job. Only Torre lasted longer than four seasons with his first team, leaving the Mets in 1981. Also of note is the fact that all three managers started their careers relatively young and did not field a contending team until after their 40^th birthday.

Obviously, I didn’t account for the quality of the teams each manager inherited when hired, which leaves the question of whether bad teams are more inclined to take a chance on a young, rookie manger or if 40-years old and four completed seasons are viable benchmarks in the development of a major league skipper. I may investigate this idea in more detail in the future, but for now, this snapshot seems to highlight a few encouraging trends for the 40-year old Acta’s second tour as manager.

While none of the above managers lasted particularly long with their first team, Acta’s time with Washington was cut especially short. Two and half seasons is nowhere near enough time for a manger to establish his system, develop players, and place his signature upon a team. Acta was fired before he could make any real headway in Washington.

I doubt anybody outside of the Nationals organization expected those teams to come anywhere near a winning record with the players they ran out on the field, it would have been nothing short of a miracle. Combine that with a long list of injuries, instability in the front office, and just a general lack of talented or committed players (remember, they actually traded for Austin Kearns and Felipe Lopez) and the whole situation was a mess. Acta shouldn’t be receiving criticism after the fact for what was just a flat-out, terrible team.

On the other hand, if he failed to hold the attention and respect of his players during his time as manager, that’s certainly cause for concern, but I have yet to hear any reports along those lines. As far as I can tell, Acta tends to be highly regarded and respected by both his players and the rest of the baseball community.

I don’t see this hiring as a gamble for the Indians at all. They seem extremely confident in Acta’s abilities and have a good sense of what to expect from him and I tend to agree with their evaluation thus far. I’m not suggesting Acta is going to vault the Indians back into contention next season, as they’re still in the midst of rebuilding, but I think he’ll surprise a lot of people with his passion, knowledge of the game, and ability to advance the team’s burgeoning young talent.

Quotable Acta

This is by far my favorite quote from Acta that I've discovered. It comes from a June 2008 interview he conducted in Washington with a group of local bloggers (which is pretty cool on its own). The full transcript can be found at Nats320 and provides some additional insight into how he approached certain situations that year. Anyway, here's Manny on base running:

There are 27 outs (in each game) and they are precious. I know that you guys (bloggers) being involved in doing what you do, you do a lot of research and stuff. But the average guy at home still doesn’t go out of his way to understand that just running into outs is not good. You don’t run to run. You don’t bunt to bunt. You run and you bunt when it makes sense. And that’s the way I do things.

Manny-Lantern image courtesy of Mr. Irrelevant

Cleveland Names Acta New Skipper

2009-10-25T23:33:00.004-05:00

In an aggressive move, Cleveland decided to appoint their choice for manager on Sunday, rather than waiting until after the World Series as expected. Former Nationals skipper Manny Acta was the first candidate to interview with the Tribe, but must have left quite an impression over his two interviews with ownership and front office personnel.

Former Mets and Rangers manager Bobby Valentine, Torey Lovullo of the Columbus Clippers, and Dodgers hitting coach Don Mattingly were also interviewed. Angels bench coach Ron Roenicke was scheduled to interview with Cleveland at some point, but the team appeared to make a decision before those talks could further develop.

Besides standing out amongst the other candidates, Acta was also being courted by the Houston Astros to fill their managerial vacancy. This may have pushed Cleveland to make an offer to their top choice earlier than anticipated. Acta also has a history with the Astros franchise, as they drafted him in 1986 and later gave him his first management opportunity in the minors in 1993.

Acta broke into the majors as a third base coach with Montreal from 2002 to 2004 under former Cleveland player/manager Frank Robinson before manning the same post with the Mets from 2005 to 2006 under Willie Randolph. He took over in Washington after his former boss, Robinson, was fired after the 2006 season. Acta also managed the Dominican Republic in the 2004 World Baseball Classic and led the prestigious Tigres del Licey to a Caribbean Series title that same year.

It’s unclear who made the first move, but Acta reportedly turned down Houston’s two-year guaranteed offer and chose Cleveland instead. In his post-interview press conference, Acta seemed intrigued by Cleveland’s core of “exciting young players,” stating that the “Indians have a lot more in place…pretty much a whole lineup” to build upon right away.

Acta’s contract is for three years guaranteed (2010-2012), with a club option for a fourth year in 2013. The specific salary details of the contract have not yet been released yet.

There were a few factors attached to each of the other candidates that may have worked against them:

Bobby Valentine’s 14 years of major league managerial experience (plus five more in Japan) puts him well ahead in that particular category, but all that experience would have come at a price. Valentine made about $4 million in his final year with the Chiba Lotte Marines and would have likely requested a comparable salary with Cleveland.

Shapiro has gone on record saying funds would not prevent them from hiring their choice for manager, despite owing Eric Wedge at least $1 million for the final year of his contract. While I do believe money was not an absolute limitation, I bet it factored into the discussion about Valentine. It’s doubtful a team that just slashed their payroll doesn’t place significant weight on how much they’ll be paying their next manager.

Valentine also gave out a very unusual vibe during his sit-down with the local press. From his body language to the cryptic quotes he threw out, he gave the impression that he had just finished an interview with an employee he was thinking about hiring, instead of the other way around. Bottom-line, he sounded more like an old hand amused by the whole process instead of seriously considering joining a young, rebuilding ball club (it’s difficult to describe, I just didn’t like the impression he gave at all). Valentine’s self-described “lousy loser” mentality would have been a poor fit for a club that needs patience and guidance for its young players over the next two seasons in order to mold the team into a contender once again.

Torey Lovullo has been a manager in the Tribe’s farm system for eight years, with the last four spent in Triple-A. Despite his track record with the team and relationship with many of its upper level prospects, I’m not sure Lovullo was ever under real consideration for the position. I wouldn’t be surprised if he was actually interviewing for a coaching position with Cleveland, even if it was touted as an interview for manager. Lovullo has spent twice as long managing in the minors as Wedge did, so it would make sense for the team to offer him a promotion if he is regarded highly enough to be publicly nominated for manager.

The team hinted that they wanted to move in a new direction with their next manager. With the rebuilding process in full-swing and the departure of Wedge and his entire coaching staff, now seems like a suitable time to look abroad for a truly fresh approach. Every manager since John McNamara (dismissed part-way through the 1991 season) has been an internal hire, including Mike Hargrove (1991-1999), Charlie Manuel (2000-2002), and Eric Wedge (2003-2009).

Don Mattingly was probably my least favorite candidate. First, he was already passed over for a managerial position in favor of Joe Girardi in New York, leaving him with no professional managing experience (not even in the minors). I’m not a big fan of Joe Torre’s management style either (Mattingly has worked under Torre his entire coaching career), although obviously he has had great success in New York, albeit with a ridiculous amount of rostered talent every year.

Second, Mattingly has never been around a small-market environment like Cleveland. Los Angeles and New York are basically the complete opposites of Cleveland, right down to the payroll, media presence, and fan relations. As Terry Pluto pointed out, “it would be a major shock [for Mattingly] to be under the budget limitations that will come with [the Cleveland] job.”

Personally, I am very excited about bringing Manny Acta on board as manager. He seems to be an above-average communicator with both the players and staff and has the proper mindset and experience to develop Cleveland’s core of young players. As a native of the Dominican Republic, Acta has an advantage in communicating directly with the team’s Latino players, especially those newer to the league who may not yet be fluent in English. Combine his communication skills with a positive, upbeat approach to the game and I think he will have an easy time engaging and motivating the team.

Even though he’s coming from a losing franchise in Washington, that experience should make his first season in Cleveland seem much easier by comparison. Breaking in as a major league manager is difficult enough, but the fact that he did it with the worst team in the league had to have been a nightmare at times. Hopefully, by applying the lessons he learned while managing an extreme version of a team in transition, Acta will be that much more effective during his second tour of duty as a result (if you think the Indians have it rough, they don’t even come close to the Nats’ situation).

Acta also has a reputation as an excellent evaluator of talent and is a student of sabermetrics, which should fit in well with the team’s front office culture. Unlike some old-school managers, Acta embraces new types of baseball research. Saber-oriented thinking has become common-place in major league front offices, but is still a novel idea in the dugout, so I’m eager to see how Acta applies these emerging viewpoints into his day-to-day managerial decisions.

I’ll have more on Acta’s managerial style, his tenure in D.C., and the press conference introducing him as manager later this week.

Garko Headed to San Francisco

2009-07-29T21:12:00.007-05:00

Cleveland appears to be laying the groundwork for the next wave of young talent to take the reins in 2010 after trading another veteran player this week. Ryan Garko was officially traded to San Francisco hours before the Tribe's Monday night game at Anaheim. Like Mark DeRosa and Rafael Betancourt before him, Garko was shipped out to bolster an area of need in the organization's farm system. With little starting pitching depth left in the system behind Hector Rondon and a bullpen corp that has struggled to sustain its past success over consecutive seasons, acquiring as many young, quality arms as possible seems like a good use of the team's tradeable assets.

Cleveland will receive 21 year-old Scott Barnes from San Francisco in exchange for Garko. Barnes was originally taken by the Nationals in the 43rd round of the 2005 draft, but opted to attend St. John's University in New York instead. He was later chosen by the Giants in the eighth-round of the 2008 draft. The southpaw has a career 2.60 ERA, 1.03 WHIP, and 3.95 K/BB ratio over 141.2 IP over his minor league career. He spent 2008 progressing through rookie-ball before settling in at Single-A San Jose for the entirety of the 2009 season, amassing a 2.85 ERA, 1.13 WHIP, 2.7 BB/9, and a strong 9.1 K/9 over 98.0 IP (18 starts). According to Anthony Castrovince, Barnes will report to Class-A Kinston.

Baseball America describes Barnes as having "surprising control of a 88-91 mph fastball that touches higher. He also throws a tight slider, average changeup and show-me curveball from a deceptive delivery." He may not have a blazing fastball in his arsenal, but it will be interesting to see how his off-speed and breaking pitches develop as he progresses through the minors. BA also projects Barnes as "a solid piece but at his best fits a mid-rotation starter profile."

If Barnes turns out to be a quality third or fourth starter for the Tribe, that seems like a very good return for Garko considering Cleveland was dealing from a position of depth at first base (likely the ultimate destination for Matt LaPorta and current part-time residence of Victor Martinez). Regardless of whether or not Martinez is traded, Garko was never destined to be the Indians' starter of the future at first base.

Another incentive for Cleveland to deal Garko was that he will be eligible for arbitration after this season, meaning he will become much more expensive for the 2010 season and beyond. Players are allowed to submit a new contract proposal through arbitration after they've been at the Major League level for three full seasons (an arbitration panel weighs the player's and team's proposals and decides what the final contract will be).

For example, Diamondbacks first baseman/outfielder Conor Jackson averaged an .822 OPS in his first three seasons in the Majors and made $419,500 in 2008. Meanwhile, Garko averaged an .806 OPS in his first three full seasons and is making $455,000 in 2009. After entering arbitration before the 2009 season, Jackson received a one-year deal worth $3.05 million (a 627% raise). It seems reasonable to expect Garko to receive a similar ruling to Jackson in arbitration next year.

At 28 years-old, there is a strong chance that Garko has either reached or is very near his ceiling as a hitter. His best overall season with the Tribe came in 2007 when he posted a .289/.359/.483 line with 21 HR, 29 doubles, and a 117 OPS+. Despite seeing his numbers drop across the board in 2008, Garko managed to tie Grady Sizemore for a team-leading 90 RBI. The 90 RBI season, an .899 OPS in nine 2007 playoff games, and a .292 career batting average with RISP have lent Garko a bit of a reputation as a clutch hitter.

Garko's trade value was probably about as high as it was going to get, so the Indians were wise to trade him now, along with their other veterans, to jump-start the rebuilding process. He may still have a couple career years in him offensively, but I'd be surprised if he saw any kind of significant, sustainable jump in his overall numbers at this point. He's a solid hitter with slightly above average on-base skills and decent power. While Garko did provide some versatility by playing the corner outfield positions and first base, he still has a below average glove overall.

I'm not sure what made San Francisco give up one of their best pitching prospects for a league average first baseman in line for a substantial raise, but I guess the Giants preferred Garko to incumbent Travis Ishikawa. Below is a comparison of the two players:

Player	Period	PA	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS+	UZR/150 (Inn. 1B)	WAR
R. Garko	2009	273	.285	.362	.464	114	12.1 (415.0)	1.2
	Career	1591	.282	.354	.449	108	-4.0 (2936.0)	3.9
T. Ishikawa	2009	239	.268	.319	.409	90	19.8 (544.0)	0.9
	Career	368	.271	.324	.422	94	10.0 (812.1)	0.9

Garko is a modest upgrade offensively, while Ishikawa is the better defender. Garko also holds an edge batting against lefties, with a .906 career OPS versus Ishikawa's .697 (there's only a .014 difference between them against righties, despite batting from opposite sides of the plate).

Even after looking at the numbers, I'm really struggling to figure out why the Giants made this trade. As far as I can tell, only Brian Sabean truly knows and I'm not about to blow a fuse trying to figure out that guy's logic (interestingly enough, he seems to have outdone himself in the same week). Sure, Ishikawa was having a down year at the plate, but this trade seems like Sabean was starting to get desperate to upgrade San Francisco's punch-less offense and overpaid for Garko. Looking at each player's wins above replacement (WAR), this trade probably won't even make much of an impact on the Giants final record, as there's only been a .3 win difference between them so far this season.

Based on the potential for Barnes to develop into a solid mid-rotation starter in a few years, Cleveland definitely came out ahead in this trade.

As a Garko fan, it was pretty tough seeing him head for his parent's waiting car (they were in attendance for the Anaheim game) in the stadium parking lot, luggage in tow, as an STO cameraman followed him out prior to Monday's broadcast. Ryan seemed pretty downtrodden about the whole thing and I can't blame him since Cleveland is the only organization he's ever been with in the Majors. Besides leaving behind the familiarity and routine of playing for the Tribe, Garko is also leaving many players who had come up alongside him through the minors. That has to be a difficult transition for a player who's never been traded before.

Personally, Garko was a lot of fun to watch at the plate. He seemed to have a knack for digging in and making the pitcher work thanks to a quick swing that shortened up even more when he was down in the count. It was also entertaining to see him always chatting up whoever happened to be standing at first base. Regardless of who it was, it seemed like Garko would still try and hold a conversation with them (probably telling them about how he went to Stanford).

My favorite thing about Garko may have been his Thome-esque home run swing. It's no secret that Jim Thome was Garko's idol growing up (hence the number 25 on his uniform) and it shows in how he finishes his swing after crushing a ball (I'm a bit of a baseball nerd, so I thought that was kinda cool). Not that he was bereft of opportunity in Cleveland, but hopefully Garko will get to see more playing time now that he's part of a less-crowded infield. Best of luck in San Francisco, Ryan.

The Forgotten Pioneer

2009-07-06T22:30:00.001-05:00

Sunday marked the 62nd anniversary of Larry Doby's Major League debut with the Cleveland Indians. On July 5, 1947, a 23-year old Doby stepped up to the plate against the Washington Senators as a pinch hitter. Doby struck out in the first of 32 at-bats on the season, but would kick off his Hall of Fame worthy career by establishing himself as a key member of the 1948 World Series champs. Over a six game series against the Boston Braves, Doby batted second in front of Lou Boudreau and Joe Gordon, posting a .318/.375/.500 line with 7 H, 1 R, and 2 RBI in 24 PA. He also hit the first home run by an African-American in World Series history.

In his eight full seasons with Cleveland, Doby was selected to the All Star team seven straight times and led the league in runs, homers, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS at least once over that span. In a career spanning 13 seasons, Doby finished with 1,515 hits, 253 homers, 960 runs, 970 RBI, a slash line of .283/.386/.490, and an OPS+ of 136 while making most of his starts in centerfield for the Indians.

While Larry Doby's performance on the diamond is enough to elevate him as one of baseball's all-time greats, he also has the distinction of being the first player to break the color barrier in the American League. Doby was signed by Indians owner Bill Veeck and made his big-league debut just eleven weeks after Jackie Robinson of the National League. Robinson had spent the 1946 season playing with the Dodgers' Triple-A affiliate, unlike Doby who was thrust straight into the Majors after playing the previous season with the Newark Eagles in the Negro National League. Doby quickly realized the magnitude of his presence in the Majors, recalling a conversation he had with Veeck soon after signing with Cleveland:

''Mr. Veeck told me: 'No arguing with umpires, don't even turn around at a bad call at the plate, and no dissertations with opposing players; either of those might start a race riot. No associating with female Caucasians' -- not that I was going to. And he said remember to act in a way that you know people are watching you. And this was something that both Jack and I took seriously. We knew that if we didn't succeed, it might hinder opportunities for other Afro-Americans.''

Despite being separated by a mere eleven weeks, history tends to remember Larry Doby and Jackie Robinson very differently. Robinson is praised as a ground-breaking pioneer in not only baseball, but the civil rights movement. As an African-American player in a previously segregated sport, Robinson had to contend with ugly, racist behavior, segregation, vicious insults, and even threats of violence or death on a daily basis (as did the majority of blacks in 1940's America), all on a public stage. Even some of Robinson's own teammates were wary of interacting with him due to the public opinion at the time and often acted cold or hostile towards him.

The truth is, Larry Doby faced the exact same humiliation, insults, and dangers as Robinson. After being introduced to his new teammates by Veeck, Doby described the tension present in the clubhouse at the time: "Some of the players shook my hand,'' Doby recalled in a 1997 interview, ''but most of them didn't. It was one of the most embarrassing moments of my life." Doby would go on to earn the respect and friendship of many of his teammates and remembered the city of Cleveland warmly in his Hall of Fame induction speech, but it was an uphill battle to garner even the basic courtesies and respect afforded to his white teammates by the baseball community and society as a whole.

Even after winning the World Series in 1948, Doby's fondest memory from his career was when teammate Steve Gromek embraced Doby in a moment of spontaneous celebration. Said Doby, "I would always relate back to that whenever I was insulted, or rejected by hotels. I'd always think back to that picture of Gromek and me. It would take away all the negatives."

Those eleven weeks where Robinson was the only black man in Major League baseball did not soften the blow from the swarm of racial epithets hurled at Doby in the field, nor the sting of an opposing player's tobacco juice as he spit into a sliding Doby's eyes. Both men displayed extraordinary courage just by showing up for work every day when so many people in the stands and the opposing dugout wanted nothing more than to see them fail, or worse. Not because they played for a rival team, but because of the color of their skin.

Eleven weeks are all that separated the debut of the two players most responsible for knocking down baseball's long-standing color barrier and paving the way for a future generation of ballplayers who may not have otherwise had the opportunity.

Why has Larry Doby never been able to step out from under the shadow of Jackie Robinson? Are their accomplishments not equal in the eyes of historians, fans, and the media? Sadly, no. History has always had a pre-occupation with those who came first. Even in the example of Larry Doby who followed so closely in Jackie Robinson's footsteps and made such a lasting impact, the second person through the door is never remembered as fondly as the first.

Robinson arrived on the scene as a burgeoning civil rights movement was making its way to the forefront and he soon transcended his role as a pro athlete to became a representative of something greater than baseball. As is often the case in history, there is only room for one icon in the national consciousness and Jackie Robinson was the player who captured the attention and imagination of the country during this turbulent period.

The media was keen to take advantage of Robinson's status as the first black player in the Majors. Robinson was not one to shy away from the spotlight either. His thrilling style of play and charismatic personality only added to his admiration by the press as a hot ticket. Doby recognized the media's infatuation with Robinson, while he was only mentioned in the boxscores. "[The discrimination] was every bit as bad as Jackie went through," said Doby, "but Jackie had already gone through it, so I had no publicity."

Doby was often viewed as aloof by fans and the media, but this was just a mis-interpretation of his reserved personality and utmost professionalism. Remembering the foundation he was expected to set for future players Doby "always tried to act in a dignified manner. When I was in the major leagues, some people thought I was a loner. But, well, when Joe DiMaggio was off by himself, they said he just wanted his privacy." Doby's outstanding performance on the field and his struggles with racism often went overlooked by the national media as a result. Robinson may have also held an edge in being the premier player for the Brooklyn Dodgers, a franchise that has become almost synonymous with the Golden Age of baseball for multiple generations of fans.

Today, Jackie Robinson is more celebrated than ever, especially within Major League Baseball. April 15, the anniversary of Robinson's debut, was declared Jackie Robinson Day within the Majors. Since 2007, the occasion has been marked by allowing all players the choice of wearing Robinson's number 42 for the day. Robinson's number was retired league-wide in 1997 and has since been hanging in every Major League ballpark alongside the franchise's own retired numbers. In addition, the annual Civil Rights Game (originally held in Memphis in 2007 between St. Louis and Cleveland) tends to focus on Robinson's first step rather than highlighting the impact of immediate predecessors such as Larry Doby and other early pioneers in the 40's and 50's who gradually chipped away at the looming remains of baseball's color barrier.

The Cleveland Indians have made efforts to bring Larry Doby's accomplishments to the attention of modern fans, holding Larry Doby Day on August 10, 2007. Every member of the Indians wore Doby's number 14 in tribute during the game, with the game-used jerseys later being auctioned for charity (while this is a great tribute, I'm curious as to why it wasn't held the week of July 5 instead). Yet, most baseball fans outside of Cleveland still have no sense of who Larry Doby was and that's a shame. "Jackie's number is hung in every ballpark in the country," said former Cleveland DH Ellis Burks in 2003, "but Larry Doby never did get enough recognition for what he did."

Not to take anything away from Jackie Robinson, but how long will baseball continue to relegate Larry Doby's legacy to the fringes of history? While they may have just been ballplayers on the surface, Larry Doby and Jackie Robinson were ultimately striving for equality in the sport of baseball and beyond. It's too bad Major League Baseball has honored their memories with anything but.

Sources:

Berkow, Ira. "He Crossed the Color Barrier, but in Another's Shadow." The New York Times 23 February 1997.

Bechtel, Mark. "The Next One." Sports Illustrated 30 June 2003.

Jackson, Scoop. "Eleven Weeks to Irrelevance." ESPN.com 13 July 2007.

Schneider, Russell. The Boys of the Summer of '48. Champaign, Illinois: Sports Publishing, Inc., 1998.

Pavano's Adjustments Pay Off in KC

2009-04-16T23:10:00.001-05:00

Based on how poorly Carl Pavano pitched in his last start (1.0 IP, 6 H, 3 BB, 9 ER), I said it would take a miracle for him to come up with a quality start against Kansas City. Well, Pavano must have gotten whatever was ailing him out of his system because he looked like a completely different pitcher in his second start with Cleveland. Pavano finished with 4 ER, 8 H, 0 BB, and 8 K over six strong innings. That may not seem like much, but if he can provide those kinds of starts on a regular basis I think Cleveland will be very pleased with him. Plus, Pavano proved that he's not just damaged goods and actually has some gas left in the tank.

The guy's arm seemingly came back from the dead in the span of a week, although I'm still not sure where on this spectrum of extremes Pavano will eventually settle. Maybe all he needed was a wake-up call after a gruelingly long spring, but whatever the case Pavano bought himself a "get out of jail free card" by bouncing back against Kansas City.

I was curious as to what type of adjustments Pavano made between his first and second starts. To do this required more than just the typical box score stats. I wanted to track any changes in velocity, movement, and location on Pavano's pitches between starts. Fortunately, MLB.com archives the results from its Gameday application over the course of a season, allowing fans to access Pitch f/x data for every batter a pitcher faces.

I've ventured into more detailed Pitch f/x analysis on occasion, but I'd like to take a new approach today and try to glean some insight from only a small sampling of individual at-bats. I decided to keep the number of batters from each start down to three this time in order to keep the presentation and workload simple. I did review the data from the entire start before drawing any conclusions, so any analysis tends to be within a broader context. The idea is to key-in on specific pitches and see how their velocity and break may have changed, in addition to how effective they were (like if a certain pitch was thrown for a strike more consistently than before). If you haven't seen MLB's Gameday application before, this link offers a basic explanation of what's displayed in the images below.

4/9/2009 at Texas: TEX 12 - CLE 8

Michael Young - 1st Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
M. Young	1st	1	87	3"	17"	FB	Called K
		2	88	5"	14"	FB	Foul
		3	88	3"	16"	FB	2B

Pavano's approach to Michael Young is pretty typical of his pitch selection to the 12 batters he faced. With the exception of an occasional changeup or slider, Pavano rarely went to anything other than an 86-88 MPH fastball. This allowed Texas to get comfortable early and just sit on the same type of pitch the entire time Pavano was on the mound. Five of Pavano's six hits came off that bland 86-88 MPH fastball. Pavano also did a poor job of locating his pitches. He took an overly cautious approach throughout the game, nibbling around the edges of the strike zone (this trend appears in all three featured at-bats). It didn't take long for Texas to realize that Pavano wasn't going to challenge them, so they started hacking away at anything that crossed into the zone.

Marlon Byrd - 1st Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
M. Byrd	1st	1	79	8"	8"	CHG	Ball
		2	87	3"	13"	FB	Ball
		3	87	4"	13"	FB	HR

Pavano continues to skirt the strike zone against Marlon Byrd due to either a lack of control or a lack of confidence in his pitches. Here, Pavano fails to establish himself in the count by getting behind 2-0. When he does manage to find the zone, it's with a nearly identical, flat, 87 MPH fastball which Byrd launches into the stands for a two-run homer.

Ian Kinsler - 2nd Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
I. Kinsler	2nd	1	86	3"	17"	FB	Ball
		2	88	5"	14"	FB	Ball
		3	86	5"	16"	FB	HR

At this point, Pavano had already given up five runs and just walked Omar Vizquel to start the second inning. He's really got nothing to lose in being more aggressive and trying to throw something other than a fastball (although honestly, I'm not sure how big a role Shoppach played in the terrible pitch selection). Instead, he goes to the exact same type of pitch that got him hammered in the first and gives up another two-run homer after falling behind 2-0.

There's really no excuse for going to the exact same type of pitch and watching it get hit every time. I knew Pavano had to realize what was going on, yet he made little to no adjustment in his approach even after heading to the dugout for half an inning.

4/14/2009 at Kansas City: KC 9 - CLE 3

Coco Crisp - 1st Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
C. Crisp	1st	1	88	5"	12"	FB	Ball
		2	88	7"	13"	SNK	Foul
		3	82	9"	6"	CHG	Ball
		4	82	6"	13"	CHG	Ball
		5	79	14"	10"	CRV	Pop-up (out)

You can see a difference in Pavano's approach against Kansas City from the very first batter. Note the variety of pitches that he uses against Coco Crisp here. Pavano starts out with a nice combination of fastballs and off-speed pitches. The subtle difference between his sinker and standard fastball (both are thrown at similar speeds, but the sinker has more bite to it) fools Crisp and causes him to foul off a pitch that probably looked like another outside fastball before breaking.

Pavano also does a good job of using the entire plate, giving Crisp multiple locations to worry about in the at-bat rather than clustering all his pitches in one quadrant like he did against Texas. I really like the way Pavano started out Crisp with the fastball before gradually decreasing his velocity and ramping up the break of each consecutive pitch. He eventually gets Crisp to pop-out on a 79 MPH curveball.

He may not be pounding the strike zone in this particular example (there was plenty of that later on), but he gives the batter a reason to protect the plate and actually swing at a few pitches outside the zone as opposed to just giving them the exact same look every time.

Alex Gordon - 2nd Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
A. Gordon	2nd	1	92	5"	17"	FB	Swinging K
		2	81	8"	11"	CHG	Ball
		3	91	6"	15"	SNK	Swinging K
		4	83	8"	13"	CHG	Swinging K

Pavano is very aggressive against Alex Gordon, striking him out on four pitches. This approach resulted in Pavano throwing 70% of his pitches for strikes against the Royals, which is excellent given the stuff he had on display that night. Check out the two 91-92 MPH fastballs Pavano serves to Gordon (he hit 90 MPH on a regular basis throughout the start). I didn't even know Pavano could still throw that fast, let alone nail the inside corner with it. Pavano gives Gordon a tempting look inside with a legit heater, inducing a swinging strike. He then moves down and away with another heater before cutting 8 MPH off the previous pitch with a breaking changeup for the strikeout (this time he would have struck out Gordon whether he swung or not).

It was clear early on that Pavano wasn't going to give the Royals batters any room to breathe.

Mike Jacobs - 6th Inning

Batter	Inning	No.	SPD (MPH)	BRK	PFX	PITCH	RESULT
M. Jacobs	6th	1	90	6"	15"	FB	Called K
		2	89	5"	13"	FB	Foul
		3	82	8"	5"	CHG	Called K

Jumping ahead to the sixth inning, Pavano is faced with home run-threat, Mike Jacobs. The set-up for this at-bat is similar to what Pavano faced in Texas. He knows Jacobs can easily take him out if he makes a mistake and there are already two runners on base ahead of him. Unlike with Texas, Pavano chooses to go right after Jacobs with a called strike up and in on the hands. Pavano doesn't allow Jacobs to get his arms extended on the swing and tries to jam him up and in for a second time. This does a great job of setting up the changeup which completely catches Jacobs off-guard after fighting off the last pitch inside. The changeup is located right along the border of the strikezone, but away from the barrel of the bat as Jacobs takes the bait for the strikeout.

This is another example of Pavano setting up his pitches and effectively changing speeds, something sorely lacking in Texas.

Conclusion

Normally, I wouldn't be so interested in a 6.0 inning, 8 H, 4 ER day by the team's third starter. However, Pavano's outing against Kansas City is significant because it answers the question of what Pavano is still capable of in a Major League game. The fact that he racked up 8 strikeouts while walking none leads me to believe that he has the potential to be even better in the future. He displayed the ability to command multiple pitches for strikes, change speeds, set-up his pitches, and get out of jams. Pavano could have easily gone seven innings in this game (he only threw 80 pitches), but Wedge probably decided to sit Pavano in case trouble found him again (a similar approach was taken with Paul Byrd, who was notorious for his late inning breakdowns, although this isn't necessarily the case with Pavano).

Granted, this was all against a struggling KC offense, but a start like this could really boost Pavano's confidence and encourage him to continue this aggressive, varied approach. He may have even validated some mechanical adjustments between starts, as evidenced by the additional 2-4 MPH on his fastball the second time out.

With the pitching staff still sorting itself out, any quality starts from Pavano will give Cleveland some much needed stability in the starting rotation as they struggle to get their season back on track following a 2-7 start. I still have no idea which Pavano will show up in New York on Sunday, but the flash of potential in KC is reason enough to be at least a little more optimistic about his future with the Tribe.

All Pitch f/x images were generated by MLB's Gameday application.

Tribe Pitching Falls Flat in Opening Week

2009-04-12T14:05:00.001-05:00

Cleveland's pitching staff hasn't done much to disprove the idea that they could be the team's Achilles heel this season. In fact, the blame for three of the team's last four losses sits squarely on the shoulders of the pitchers. Simply losing five in a row to start the season was unnerving enough, but to see the team's biggest potential weakness establish itself so early is not a good sign. Even the supposedly sturdy bullpen has had its share of blowups, with Rafael Perez, Jensen Lewis, and Kerry Wood all getting roughed up fresh out of Spring Training.

The shortcomings of the pitching staff puts the team's leadership in a difficult position. Obviously, it's far too early to be taking any drastic measures, but Wedge and Shapiro are no doubt thinking ahead as to what they'll do if this trend continues. Unfortunately, I don't think their contingency plan is meant to cover the entire pitching staff, so some of these guys have no choice but to suck it up and do their job next time out.

The real question is at what point should the team start to really worry if the pitching continues to be this inconsistent? I know it's only the first week of a long season and that everything is magnified since all eyes are on the small number of games that have actually been played. That doesn't make it any easier to watch. I can't fault the front office either, since I was cautiously optimistic about the rotation during Spring Training as well (perhaps more so than Shapiro himself).

The only player that I would be willing to pull the trigger on this early is Pavano, but even that isn't as simple as it seems. David Huff (5.0 IP, 4 ER, 5 H, 2 HR, 3 BB), Aaron Laffey (3.1 IP, 5 ER, 6 H, 1 HR, 2 BB), and Kirk Saarloos (6.0 IP, 5 ER, 7 H, 2 HR, 1 BB) all came up short in their Columbus debuts, which leaves me guessing as to who could get called up as a replacement. Regardless of how bad it looked, Cleveland isn't going to cut a starter after just one game. Pavano was supposed to be part of a multi-pitcher attack to provide some (hopefully) quality innings until Westbrook returned, but it looks like that plan will backfire unless the "second wave" of arms is brought up sooner than anticipated. And don't think I'm going easy on Cliff Lee just because I hadn't mentioned him yet, he's got a lot of work to do to silence concerns that his terrible Spring Training was anything more than a meaningless blip on the radar.

The bottom line is that until the team has a larger body of work to go on, all they can do is continue to be prudent in how much slack they cut their pitchers and hope that Carl Willis and his coaching staff can find a solution to the individual struggles holding the rest of the team back.

Cleveland can't afford to get off to such a slow start in what should be a tightly contested division (not to mention the AL East, which will probably be fighting tooth-and-nail for the Wild Card spot all year). The franchise hasn't gotten off to an 0-5 start since 1985 and now join Washington (0-5) as the only teams in the Majors who are still win-less.

Today I wanted to characterize the first five outings from the starting pitching. Despite the end result, there were actually a few positive signs.

Cliff Lee

4/6 @ TX: 5.0 IP, 10 H, 7 ER, 1 BB, 5 SO, 1 HR, 79-53 pitches-strikes, 3-7 GB-FB

I was willing to chalk this start up as an anomaly at first glance. Combine a sore forearm from a deflected linedrive, Opening Day pressure, a very strong Texas lineup, and a career 9.19 ERA over 6 career starts at Arlington and the odds seemed to be stacked against Lee that day. Lee retired the first four batters he faced until being struck in the left forearm by a liner. After being inspected by the training staff, Lee continued to pitch, but allowed five more base runners on four hits and a walk before getting out of the inning. My guess is that the soreness in Lee's arm temporarily broke his concentration or mechanics because he seemed fine in the third and fourth innings. Lee gave up just two hits while striking out four in the middle innings before surrendering a three-run homer in the fifth.

4/11 vs. TOR: 5.0 IP, 7 H, 4 ER, 4 BB, 5 SO, 0 HR, 102-57 pitches-strikes, 3-7 GB-FB

The match-up between last year's Cy Young winner and runner-up was supposed to be where Lee redeemed himself after a poor showing on Opening Day. Instead, Lee struggled, but no longer had the benefit of the doubt since he was pitching at home against a tamer Toronto lineup. Lee failed to go beyond five innings for the second straight start after averaging 7.19 IP per start in 2008. In the post-game wrap, Wedge thought his ace was "a little erratic with his fastball. There were times when he was throwing where he wanted to, but he was also missing by quite a bit at times." Lee didn't throw a curveball until the 9th batter he faced (resulting in a K) and relied heavily on his fastball throughout the start.

One of Lee's keys to success last season was how his fastball and curveball complimented each other. 2008 saw Lee utilize the curveball about 9.6% of the time (a career high) and his heater 70.1%. It's also worth noting that in going to his fastball so often, Lee possessed excellent command of it (something he lacked in his last start). In two starts, Lee has stuck mostly with his fastball (57.0%), cutter (11.4%), and changeup (24.1%), using the curve only 7.6% of the time. It will be interesting to see how Lee's pitch selection evolves after a few more starts and if he finds success by going back to last year's strategy of mixing in the curveball more often.

Fausto Carmona

4/8 @ TX: 5.0 IP, 7 H, 6 ER, 2 BB, 4 SO, 1 HR, 95-59 pitches-strikes, 6-5 GB-FB

I thought Carmona looked better than what the boxscore indicates in this case. He displayed a good range of velocity (84-94 MPH) and had decent action on his sinking fastball. Carmona's undoing against Texas was that he just made too many mistakes. Many of the balls Carmona left up in the zone were punished by the Rangers. Others, like the ball Kinsler golfed from his ankles for a double, seemed a bit unlucky. I think Carmona is the most likely to bounce-back immediately because many of his runs seemed to come from a lack of concentration or a few bad pitches. Overall, Carmona seemed to have decent stuff and was able to find the strike zone 62% of the time, but Texas seemed especially patient at times, making it difficult for Fausto to set-up his go-to pitches.

Look for Carmona to get his confidence and focus back and enjoy much better results in his next outing.

Carl Pavano

4/9 @ TX: 1.0 IP, 6 H, 9 ER, 3 BB, 1 SO, 2 HR, 39-21 pitches-strikes, 1-1 GB-FB

The only way Pavano's debut as an Indian could have been any worse was if Wedge had left him in for more than one inning. If Pavano fails to significantly improve on this first start, there's no justification for keeping him on the team. If Shapiro needs more time to evaluate his options in Columbus he might as well stretch out Zach Jackson to make a couple of starts in lieu of Pavano (the downside of this is that they could realistically need Jackson to fill in the gaps for another struggling starter). The stark contrast between Pavano and Jackson's 4 innings of 4 hit, 2 run ball was laughable. Jackson came out of the bullpen and basically schooled Pavano in how to deal with the Texas lineup, striking out six and walking none. The only good to come out of Pavano's start was that it gave Jackson a chance to confirm he can be an effective long-man or emergency starter in a pinch. I was impressed with the way Jackson attacked hitters (70% of his pitches were strikes) and mixed up his location and velocity to keep hitters off-balance, especially after being called in on short-notice like that.

I wasn't expecting Pavano to have great velocity; at this point in his career that's not his game. But where was the pitch location that's supposed to be his bread and butter? Pavano either couldn't locate his pitches or he had so little confidence in his stuff that he was afraid to throw strikes. Most of his pitches were either elevated or too far outside the zone to even be borderline calls. It felt like Pavano had a very weak presence on the mound and had absolutely no answer for the loaded Texas lineup. At one point, it looked like Pavano was just avoiding the hitters zone as much as possible, going through the motions, waiting to be pulled. I can't blame Wedge for leaving him in even after the seven runs, since calling on the bullpen to pitch almost an entire game would have its own adverse consequences.

Short of a miraculous turn-around, I wouldn't be surprised if Pavano was cut after two more starts.

Scott Lewis

4/10 vs. TOR: 4.1 IP, 7 H, 4 ER, 1 B, 3 SO, 2 HR, 94-61 pitches-strikes, 3-6 GB-FB

Lewis looked extremely sharp out of the gate, nailing Martinez's glove and locating the ball well. The 25-year old southpaw showcased his ability to paint both corners of the plate and use his fastball and changeup in tandem effectively. He also didn't seem to get rattled when faced with a lead-off double in the third inning. Toronto's hitters seemed to make the necessary adjustments to Lewis' strategy the second time through the lineup, resulting in a three-run fourth inning. Lewis gave up four consecutive hits in the fourth: two singles, a double, and a two-run homer. He was pulled in the fifth after coughing up a home run to Marco Scutaro on an obvious mistake pitch right down the middle of the plate at the letters (the rain had picked up to a steady downpour at that point, so that didn't help matters). The key to Lewis improving will be if he can counter his opponent's adjustments the second and third time through the lineup. While it's great that he can locate his fastball inside, Jays' hitters were starting to catch up to balls trailing in on them and making contact for hits.

Lewis no longer has the benefit of being an unknown rookie to Major League hitters, so he'll have to adapt to remain effective at this level.

Scott Lewis Sets Tribe Rotation

2009-03-31T23:13:00.009-05:00

I'm still not sure what to make of Scott Lewis. With a grand total of eight starts between Buffalo and Cleveland last season, it's difficult to get a true bearing on how the 25-year old lefty will perform over an extended period in the Majors. Apparently, Tribe management has enough confidence in Lewis to grant him the final spot in the starting rotation in the closing weeks of Spring Training.

Lewis came into camp as a dark horse of sorts, forced to state his case against the experience of Aaron Laffey and Jeremy Sowers and the momentum of a then-healthy David Huff. My prediction at the beginning of camp was for Laffey to tighten his grip on a fifth rotation slot that was essentially his to lose with Huff settling in as the emergency starter in Columbus. I was excited about the prospect of either pitcher making it into the Tribe's rotation this season. Each southpaw features a different set of strengths, with Laffey relying heavily on groundball outs and Huff utilizing precise location and a diverse arsenal of pitches to fool batters.

I thought Laffey held an edge this time because his 143 innings in the Majors alone outpaced that of Huff's entire pro career (214 minor league innings). In a rotation with a rebounding Carmona, a rehabbing Pavano, and the occasionally fragile Reyes, Laffey's unique combination of experience and talent made him a stand-out amongst the youthful rotation candidates. With so much uncertainty in the rotation, Cleveland felt fairly confident in what to expect from Laffey at the highest level of competition. While Laffey has already made his debut, all signs point to Huff being Major League-ready as well.

The only real set-back Huff has experienced since college was an elbow injury that cost him part of the 2007 season. After showing no residual effects from the injury in 2008, Huff continued to tear through opposing batters as he made a smooth transition from Akron to Buffalo in his age 23 season. Huff finished 2008 with a 2.53 ERA, 0.96 WHIP, and 4.93 K/BB over a healthy 145.4 IP, punching his VIP ticket to Goodyear in the process. Clearly, Huff was ready for a new challenge in 2009. Unfortunately, Huff made it through just four innings in exhibition games before being shut down due to tendinitis in his left bicep. With flashbacks to the 2007 elbow issue resurfacing, Cleveland took the cautious route and shut-down the prized lefty for much of camp.

Huff may have missed out on an opportunity to impact the race for the fifth rotation spot, but Terry Pluto reports that Huff was back in action at minor league camp after a quick rebound from the bicep injury. According to Pluto, Huff has been totally locked in at camp, preventing any base runners from to advancing past first base over 12 IP until a Beau Mills tater left the park on Monday.

With Huff making an early exit, the competition came down to Laffey and Scott Lewis. Management was on-board with Laffey from the beginning and made it clear that the job was his to lose. Laffey reflected this sentiment, stating "I have that confidence that it's going to be my spot" entering the second week of March. Laffey had plenty of motivation heading into camp after being demoted to AAA in late July and struggling to regain his footing for the remainder of the 2008 season. He was outstanding in May, tossing 34 innings over five starts with a 0.79 ERA and 1.02 WHIP, but fell apart in June and July with a 6.24 ERA and 1.78 WHIP over 53.3 IP in 10 starts. Elbow tightness supposedly affected Laffey's control, leading to the inconsistent season.

The team tends to focus on many factors when evaluating a pitcher during the pre-season. Given how uneven the whole Spring Training experience is, from the lack of innings to the uneven quality of opposing lineups to the lingering effects of a long off-season, the usual performance stats are given minimal consideration in camp (Wedge claims he doesn't even look at stats during Spring Training). This amplifies the importance of a pitcher's current physical condition, preparation prior to each start, adjustments made on the fly, and composure under pressure along with pitch velocity and movement, control, and a consistent delivery. Even if a pitcher has a poor outing in the box score, the bottom line is the impression made on the coaching staff and general manager.

The lack of substantial innings makes a consistent execution of these things crucial to a pitcher trying to win a spot out of camp. A bad week by one player can provide enough of an opening for the competition to pull ahead. I think a lack of consistency was what cost Laffey the job that he had been favored to win. Even though the overall numbers between Laffey and Lewis are similar, Laffey was more erratic on the mound over those 13 innings. Here's how they compared through March 20:

Player	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	GB/FB
S. Lewis	13.1	4.12	1.45	2.00	1.72
A. Laffey	13.0	6.92	1.46	2.25	2.50

In the team's opinion, Lewis looked more prepared for the start of the season than Laffey. Maybe Laffey was a little too relaxed in his approach and let a few of his exhibition starts get away from him or maybe a few of his bad habits from last season carried over into camp. Whatever the reason, Lewis out-pitched Laffey in what appears to be a minor upset as far as Spring Training competitions go.

Having Lewis start the season in Cleveland feels more like an extended tryout to me though. It's not so much that Lewis looks better right now, rather the team wants to gain some clarity on how big a role Lewis may play in the future. I haven't seen much to indicate the team is very confident in what to expect out of Lewis over an extended period. This could be their way of filling in some of the gaps on the depth chart by getting a better read on what they have in their rookie pitcher.

A similar scenario has played out in the past with Sowers in 2006. Sowers made his Major League debut against Cincinnati after a late June call-up. While he didn't blow away opposing batters, the then 23-year old was steady over his first 14 starts, compiling a 3.57 ERA, 1.18 WHIP, and 1.75 K/BB in 88.3 IP. Back-to-back complete game shutouts on the road on July 22 and 28 solidified his role in the starting rotation for the remainder of the season. Sowers started the 2007 season with Cleveland, but fell short of his previous effort with a 6.42 ERA over 13 starts (67.3 IP). He has struggled to secure a permanent starting job with Cleveland ever since.

Like Sowers, Scott Lewis made a splash in his debut, tossing 14 consecutive scoreless innings and winning all four of his starts. Lewis had a bit of a rough go in his final two starts against hard-hitting Detroit and Chicago (10 IP, 14 H, 4 HR, 7 ER), but finished with a 2.62 ERA and 2.50 K/BB ratio. Lewis' September stint in Cleveland no doubt aided his audition in February and March.

There are two key differences between the duel southpaw's debuts (besides a disparate number of starts). First, this isn't 2006 where the Tribe finished in fourth place with a 78-84 record (Todd Hollandsworth started in Sowers' debut, if that tells you anything). This squad is a playoff contender and doesn't have the luxury of testing rookie pitchers in uncharted waters purely for evaluation purposes. If the rookie is the best option on the roster, fine, but most of the starting rotation will already be on a short leash and Lewis should be no exception. Second, this team is loaded with starting pitching depth. If Lewis shows signs of being overwhelmed, fatigued, or unable to make the necessary adjustments Cleveland should make that call to Columbus without hesitation.

I expect Laffey to snap out of whatever mysterious funk he's been in lately and judging by what I've heard thus far, Huff could turn out to be the impact rookie for Cleveland this season (LaPorta or Brantley would have earned this designation if it weren't for the fact that the offense is the least of this team's problems). I still consider Sowers more of a secondary option behind Laffey and Huff, but given his quasi-veteran status and modest improvements from last season he may be higher up on Shapiro's speed-dial than I realize. My point is, Lewis will need to carry that Spring Training mentality into the regular season, since he'll be fighting to keep his job from Day 1.

Decisions made regarding the starting rotation in March may ultimately prove meaningless come June or July. I have a feeling the state of the rotation will remain fluid during the first half of the season as the health and effectiveness of Pavano, Reyes, and Lewis are tested in meaningful games. This could prove to be a blessing or a curse, depending on how the organization's vaunted depth handles the opportunity (think Juan Gonzalez's hammy in 2005). I have no idea what we'll see out of Scott Lewis, but I also know we haven't seen the last of Laffey and Huff this season.

Weather or Worry?

Terry Pluto provided an interesting quote from veteran pitcher Kerry Wood in a recent article addressing the troublesome weather conditions at Goodyear:

Not long after Cliff Lee was spanked for seven runs in five innings Wednesday, Tribe closer Kerry Wood said there are real reasons why pitchers complain it's hard to grip and throw the baseball in Arizona's dry, desert air.
"It sometimes feels like baby powder [is on the ball]," said Wood.
Those words came just after Wood threw a 1-2-3 sixth inning, whiffing two.

Pluto points out that "not every Tribe pitcher has been hit hard this spring," citing the success of Fausto Carmona, Carl Pavano, Anthony Reyes, and Jensen Lewis in the desert environment (although Fausto could probably pitch in a snowstorm and still manage to find the the strike zone). Personally, I'm not buying the lack of humidity as a real excuse. The same issue pops up at many West Coast locales and during frigid night games early and late in the season. If a pitcher doesn't know how to deal with the ambient air conditions by now, they're going to run into trouble at some point.

Cliff Lee brushed off the "dry ball" issue as just another excuse, but Scott Lewis...not so much. I'm probably being a bit harsh, but an athlete at that level really needs to be aware of how the environment can affect his performance on the field. High winds blowing the ball towards the fence are one thing; no way to control that. But blaming a wild start on the lack of humidity?

Lewis got jacked up in his last two tune-ups (6.2 IP, 21 H, 15 ER, 6 HR), so hopefully he was able to learn something from those beat-downs beyond "use more rosin." Otherwise, he's going to have a tough time pitching in the cold, dry months of the season.

No Masa?

2009-03-22T23:56:00.006-05:00

Spring Training numbers typically don't mean much for veteran players. For reliever Masahide Kobayashi, an exceptionally poor showing this spring has placed his future with Cleveland in a precarious position. Kobayashi has been rocked just about every time he's taken the mound this offseason, surrendering 8 earned runs on 11 hits in only five innings of work. Masa's 14.40 ERA is by far one of the worst among the Tribe's returning relief pitchers and is only a few tenths of a point better than Tomo Ohka's (he was cut last week). In fact, the only reliever with a worse Spring ERA and at least four IP is Eddie Mujica and I don't like his chances of making the team despite being out of minor league options.

ERA isn't everything in March though, just ask team ace Cliff Lee, proud owner of a freshly minted Cy Young award and an 18.89 ERA in his 6.2 innings so far. What's put Kobayashi in Wedge's doghouse is how ineffective he has looked during camp. Some pitchers get rocked because they're trying to practice a certain pitch against live batters, like Lee and his intentionally fastball-heavy outing against Texas. Others display good velocity or action on their pitches, but don't quite have the complete package ready for Opening Day. Those pitchers typically don't have to deal with much additional pressure from the coaching staff.

I haven't had a chance to see Masa throw this offseason, but the few reports I've heard mention some minor inconsistencies with his delivery and a difficulty in keeping the ball down in the zone. With so many pitchers vying for work in the exhibition games, Kobayashi hasn't had much of an opportunity to act on what pitching coach Carl Willis and company are telling him. Even if Masa's five innings were ugly, they're still only five innings.

Fortunately for Kobayashi, he still has a lot of time to make adjustments during this year's extended Spring Training. As the Major League roster continues to get trimmed there should also be more opportunities for Masa as well. A strong rebound over the final 12 Cactus League games against increasingly more difficult lineups (starters will begin to see more at-bats as the season approaches) will go a long way in regaining some semblance of confidence in Kobayashi from Wedge.

It's still too early to decide Kobayashi's fate, but all he has to do is work out the kinks in his delivery over the next three weeks. He was guaranteed a roster spot heading in and I'd be surprised if Cleveland cut him from the team unless his pitching totally fell off a cliff. Even then, I think a more likely destination would be the disabled list to start the season.

Assuming Kobayashi is healthy (I have my doubts, but Masa says he's fine) his struggles in March are a legitimate concern. The whole point of Cleveland limiting him to six innings in the last two months of the 2008 season was so he'd be ready for 2009. Well, the 2009 season is almost here and Masa is still throwing like the same guy who posted a 10.32 ERA and 2.47 WHIP over 11.1 IP after the All Star break (small sample size, I know, but those numbers are still pretty representative of how bad he actually was). I still believe that Masa just ran out of steam in the second half of last season. I don't even think there was a serious injury involved, Kobayashi just seemed fatigued half-way through his first Major League season.

Regular readers are probably familiar with my take on Kobayashi by now and I'm still very confident that the transition between NPB and MLB is at the root of Kobayashi's struggles. The NPB regular season has only 144 games compared to the 162 for MLB. Combine the longer season with more stressful outings because of the superior hitters and tougher lineups and you can see how the workload can pile up quickly on a 34 year old rookie.

It's possible Cleveland underestimated the toll this transition would take on Kobayashi over the course of an entire season given his age. I'm not sure there was any way Cleveland could have predicted Kobayashi's struggles though; he is the exception rather than the rule. Most Japanese pitchers who cross the pond do so late in their career, especially relievers. Hideo Nomo and Daisuke Matsuzaka are rare cases in that they began their Major League careers at a relatively young age (both were 26). Below are four Japanese pitchers who experienced at least modest success in the Majors.

Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
S. Hasegawa	ANA	Rookie (1997)	28	116.7 (7)	0	1.80	3.93	1.40	119
	SEA	Best (2003)	34	73.0	16	1.77	1.48	1.09	291
		Career	--	720.3	33	1.68	3.71	1.32	124

Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
K. Sasaki	SEA	Rookie (2000)	32	62.7	37	2.51	3.16	1.16	145
	SEA	Best (2002)	34	60.7	37	3.65	2.52	1.05	168
		Career	--	223.3	129	3.14	3.14	1.084	138

Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
H. Okajima	BOS	Rookie (2007)	31	69.0	5	3.70	2.22	0.971	214
	BOS	Best (2007)	32	62.0	1	2.60	2.61	1.16	177
		Career	--	131.0	6	3.07	2.40	1.06	195

Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
T. Saito	LAD	Rookie (2006)	36	78.3	24	4.65	2.07	0.906	217
	LAD	Best (2007)	37	64.3	39	6.00	1.40	0.715	327
	LAD	Career	--	189.7	81	4.71	1.95	1.19	229

Note that Shigetoshi Hasegawa was the only one to break into the Majors before the age of 30. Interestingly enough, Hasegawa went on to post his best overall season at the age of 34 resulting in an appearance in the All Star game and an ERA+ of 291. Kaz Sasaki and Takashi Saito debuted at ages 32 and 36 respectively and have multiple seasons as top-shelf closers on their resumes. Hideki Okajima developed into an elite setup man for Boston in his rookie season and boasts a 2.14 postseason ERA over 16 games. There is certainly a precedent for Japanese relievers achieving success at the Major League level after the age of 30.

The reason I was so excited about Masa's rookie season was because I thought Cleveland had landed an Okajima or a Sasaki; a veteran reliever whose dominance in the Nippon Pro league would translate well in the Majors. Kobayashi's 227 saves are the most all-time by a Japanese player (Sasaki has the second-most) and he finished with a career 2.79 ERA over nine seasons. Kobayashi's career in Japan was every bit as good or better than the other relievers listed above. But unlike his fellow Japanese All Stars, Masa was merely average with the Tribe. Why did Masa struggle where similar Japanese rookies thrived?

Pitcher	Age	IP	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
M. Kobayashi	34	55.7	6	2.50	4.53	1.41	98

Even though each Japanese rookie had to deal with a similar increase in innings, Masa was the only one who failed to reach at least 60 innings, having only been effective for about 50 innings. It's difficult to say how much of this can be corrected the second time around through better conditioning and an improved knowledge of how the full season tends to play out. This is why Kobayashi's lackluster spring is such a concern. The team gave shut him down last season with the expectation that he would be ready to go for 2009, but this has not been the case. Instead, Kobayashi is still exhibiting some of the symptoms he suffered from before, although minor improvements have supposedly been made as of late.

According to Manager Eric Wedge, "this is a time when you need to see some performance to have an idea of what you can count on." Wedge is expecting to see significant improvement out of Masa heading into April or he may have to start drawing up a contingency plan. Eating Kobayashi's $3 million, guaranteed contract is certainly a possibility for Cleveland.

Aaron Fultz was owed $1.5 million entering the 2008 season, but was cut from the team in mid-March. Fultz surrendered 11 ER, 16 H, and 3 BB in 8 1/3 IP during Spring Training and looked so bad the team decided to pay him not to pitch for them. Given that Kobayashi's contract is worth twice as much and there is still a lot of time for evaluation before the season starts, I don't think the team has seriously considered cutting him yet.

I think the best approach would be to give Masa as much time as possible to improve and leave him on the 25-man roster to start the season. If he gets shelled in April and May with little hope of improvement, then the team should set him loose. They're on the hook for the $3 mil either way, so they might as well see what they have by testing him in meaningful innings first. While seeing the $3 million get flushed away would be disappointing, Masa's replacement would likely be playing for a minimum salary.

With all the talented relievers waiting in the minors, Cleveland could receive a significant upgrade to their bullpen and only have to pay another $400,000. Some of these prospects have a real shot at sticking in the Majors right now.

My pick for an early call-up to replace Kobayashi is Tony Sipp. Sipp appears to be fully recovered from Tommy John surgery and had a stellar showing in camp. The 24 year-old southpaw gave up only 3 H and 1 ER with 5 K and no walks over 4 IP, earning loads of praise from the coaching staff. Sipp has long been a highly touted prospect in the Tribe's system and word on the street is that he could make a positive impact in Cleveland. Kobayashi wasn't going to see any high-leverage innings anyway, so slotting in a rookie instead would leave the bullpen hierarchy intact.

I tend to view Sipp in a similar lens to Adam Miller in that they're both high-ceiling flamethrowers who have been derailed by injuries. Miller was a lock for the final spot in the bullpen, but complications with a finger ligament in his throwing hand have put his entire career in doubt. If Miller were healthy, now would have been the time to test him in the Majors. Now that Sipp is healthy, should the team afford him a similar opportunity? Maybe not, since Sipp was reassigned to the minors in the last round of cuts. I think he proved that he is healthy though and impressed enough people to be on the short list in case an extra reliever is suddenly needed.

Assuming the team breaks camp with seven relievers, Zach Jackson appears to be the leading candidate for the final spot as a long man, rounding out a pen that includes Kerry Wood, Rafael Perez, Jensen Lewis, Joe Smith, Rafael Betancourt, and Kobayashi.

Thoughts on the WBC

2009-03-12T20:20:00.002-05:00

I started writing this the other night with an eye towards the MLB scoreboard as the Netherlands continued to give the Dominican Republic more than they could handle. Unfortunately, I didn't have MLB.tv or ESPN Deportes (the only available broadcasts), so I was limited to the basic numbers detailing the scoreless duel playing out in San Juan. Normally, this sort of attentiveness to a slowly updated boxscore is reserved for Indians games, at which point I realized just how compelling the World Baseball Classic has become.

The inaugural Classic in 2006 may have benefited from the novelty of seeing the first global tournament featuring professional players. The 2009 tournament lacks that newness, but it still feels just as fresh and engaging as before. Granted, I'm probably not representative of the average fan in terms of my interest in baseball (exhibit A: this blog). However, I'd rather watch a competitive international match than a random regular season game between two neutral teams. Why is that?

As an American baseball fan with television coverage limited to NCAA and MLB, the WBC is as close to the international game as I can get. International competition was practically non-existent to the majority of U.S. fans before the WBC. Unless you subscribe to a special sports television package, chances are you won't be seeing much of the Caribbean or Asia Series. Both tournaments boast Major League talent playing for their respective countries but only feature Latin American or East Asian ball clubs. Until recently, the United States, Canada, and other countries did not have a tournament that allowed their professional players to participate. Of the two major venues open to the U.S. and Canada, neither accommodates professional talent.

Baseball has been played in the Pan American games since 1951, but the event fell out of favor with the U.S. media and fans long ago. Plus, Cuba's ability to field professional-caliber players against an amateur field isn't exactly fair. The Cubans have taken 12 of the 15 gold medals awarded for baseball.

Olympic baseball is in danger of disappearing altogether. In what appeared to be a purely political move, the IOC voted to drop softball and baseball from the 2016 Olympics. Part of this decision may lie in the IOC's desire for MLB to suspend its season to provide Pro players the opportunity to attend the Olympics. Obviously, MLB declined. I can't say I blame MLB for snubbing the IOC, it's not like baseball has ever gotten much respect from them in the first place. Unlike hockey, baseball has only been a medal sport since 1992, so the working relationship is not as strong. Also, the consequences of a ML player getting injured away from his team in mid-season would have been too severe for the Commissioner to justify.

Unlike hockey or basketball, the Olympic version of baseball is (was) a hollow representation of the sport and is not a true representation of a country's talent. Sure, the sense of national pride is there anytime Team USA takes the field, but the competition itself is not anywhere near the level of other venues.

The international flavor of the WBC also differs from that of Major League baseball itself. On the one hand, baseball has become so diverse that the 25-man roster of any ML team can have up to five or six-plus countries represented. From Colombia to Taiwan, 18 countries currently boast a player at the Major League level. Baseball has grown from America's national past-time to a truly global sport. The abundance of cultures, nationalities, and playing styles that that have left their mark in the Majors only serves to enrich the sport further.

On the other hand, Pro ball is a business and often lacks the outright commitment and passion evident when national pride is on the line. Instead of playing for a paycheck, players are in it for their country. How often do you see multi-millionaire athletes standing on the dugout steps, clapping and shouting at the top of their lungs like a bunch little leaguers cheering on their teammates? Players tend to wear their competitive spirits on their sleeves in these tournaments. It may be an old cliche, but international play is the ultimate example of playing for the name on the front of the jersey rather than just the one on the back.

Think about it. Do you really think a young pitcher from Latin America cares as much about the Mid-Western city stitched onto his jersey as the fans do? Probably not, though I certainly wouldn't fault him for it. I'm not talking about the commitment and comradery gained from playing for one's teammates or organization, those are two entities that every athlete should feel some attachment to. My point is, most players probably don't have a particularly strong bond with the region their current team happens to play for (this applies to every player, not just those born outside the U.S.). It's not uncommon to hear a free agent heap praise on his old team's hometown, only to bolt for a bigger payday regardless of whatever feigned loyalty he professed.

When that same pitcher wears República Dominicana across his chest, you better believe he feels what the fans feel, only amplified. It's a different level of motivation when your fellow countrymen are the fans cheering in the stands and at home. When that flag is on the sleeve the competitive drive in every player kicks into top gear be it a minor leaguer, journeyman, or All-Star. This is why a match between Japan and Korea rivals a Yanks-Sox game in intensity, why the prized piece of Jake Peavy's memorabilia collection is his Team USA jersey, why the Venezuelan team has endured the disappointment of a nation for three years, and why even an anonymous Dutch team can topple a seasoned Dominican roster that would rival any All-Star team.

None of the events named earlier boast all the elements that give the WBC so much potential. The WBC is the highest quality baseball ever played in a global tournament, combining the drama and skill of the regular season with a determination and enthusiasm normally reserved for October, all on an international stage. In addition to providing fans everywhere with a united rooting interest every four years, the WBC serves as the flagship for MLB's attempt to grow the game in non-traditional locales. The Classic is both a proving ground and spotlight for countries still trying to define their own baseball programs.

This year's games point to significant improvements out of Italy, Australia, and the Netherlands. Italy now has multiple prospects in the low minors and knocked out a Canadian team that almost took down the United States. Australia hung tough with Cuba in a 5-4 loss and beat-down a talented Mexican team in a 17-7, eight inning rout. Of course, the Netherlands stole the show by upsetting the Dominican Republic not once, but twice in the same round. Even if they get knocked out in the next round, those wins will go down as two of the biggest upsets in the history of international play.

The players on the Dominican squad will feel the sting of their elimination for a long, long time. The so-called "Republic of Baseball" is not used to losing, especially to a team with only two active Major League players on its roster compared to 23 for the Dominicans. Manager Felipe Alou meant business following his team's first loss of the tournament: "That was a team that we should've shut out. It was a hard-fought game, but now they are going to brag about having beaten the Dominican Republic."

Shortstop Jose Reyes dismissed the Dutch altogether stating "we're way better than them" following his team's 3-2 loss on Saturday. I doubt anyone would argue with Reyes on this point (even the Dutch players admitted as much), which makes the loss even more shocking. One of the best teams in the tournament simply got out-played and out-hustled by a club with far less raw talent. With a bit of luck, a timely error from the Dominicans, and the simple fact that they wanted it more, the Netherlands pulled off the win.

The real impact will be on public interest in baseball in the Netherlands. The sport itself has been played on the European mainland and the Caribbean islands for some time, but has never experienced a win of this magnitude. According to pitching coach Bert Blyleven (one of four Dutch-born pitchers to reach the Majors) the 11th inning, come-from-behind victory was "as exciting as winning a World Series." The success of the national team should cause a wave of interest among kids looking to pick up the sport, especially in the Caribbean territories where most of the Dutch players are from. With a solid foundation in place, the Netherlands could see a surge in baseball talent in the near future as a direct result of the WBC.

The WBC still has its share of problems to address before it can really take flight. Many of the game's top players declined to participate due to a lack of interest or a legitimate fear of injury prior to Opening Day. MLB will have to tread carefully in how it encourages players to participate in the future. The event will need the draw of players like Pujols, Sizemore, and Sabathia meaning a balance will need to be struck at some point. A better product on the field leads to higher quality games which should continue to attract more fans and ensure the WBC's viability.

The highest priority must still be given to protecting the participants, since no one involved wants to see a team's ace get hurt in an exhibition game, no matter how meaningful it may be.

The timing of the WBC makes it tricky to protect pitchers from injury without significantly handicapping the games themselves. Coaches and pitchers alike haven't exactly been thrilled with the idea of front-loading innings to an already grueling season either. Stricter pitch counts were implemented in 2009 to protect pitchers still making the transition from the offseason to the starting rotation. Moving the event to after the World Series does not seem to be a viable option since there is a heavy risk in overloading an already tired arm at the end of the season. In terms of generating buzz for the sport, holding the WBC as a lead-in to the regular season seems to make the most sense.

Hopefully, the four-year lapse between each WBC will help keep the event fresh and satisfy some of the critics who say it's too disruptive to the regular season.

Finally, fan interest in the U.S. market has to be sustained for MLB to continue running the WBC.

The WBC fills a sort of niche market for American baseball fans; the reality of a professionally staffed "Dream Team" competing against other countries is new to USA baseball. This niche has already been filled in other countries by events like the Asian Series, Caribbean Series, and domestic leagues in Japan, Korea, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and elsewhere. Other countries have a league to call their own, populated by native players and cited as a measuring stick and source of pride for a nation's baseball talent. U.S. fans have always had a different perspective on baseball, since the primary league people follow here consists not just of the best players from the United States, but around the world.

I think the WBC has the potential to evolve into the premier championship in baseball, second only to the MLB playoffs. If an event like this can produce great games with a playoff atmosphere in March (the Canada - U.S. match on Saturday was epic) and inspire more people around the world to play or follow baseball, I think that's more than enough reason to keep it alive. The WBC may not be perfect, but if this year's surprises are any indication, baseball fans have a lot to look forward to down the road.

Hafner's Return Could Propel Offense to Elite Level

2009-03-03T00:44:00.005-05:00

Is it possible that Cleveland is a sleeper team in 2009? The Tribe is coming off a forgettable season where the only thing they clinched in the last week of the season was a .500 record. A terrible bullpen, injuries, trades, and on and on (you know the story, I'm not going to dredge through it again). Last season, Cleveland was viewed as a serious World Series contender with every key player from the ALCS championship squad returning. This season, Cleveland has managed to stay under the radar. Even Baseball Prospectus' projections have set the bar low for 2009, awarding Cleveland and their 84-78 record the AL Central by default after handing every other team a losing record.

Many analysts have passed off Cleveland as a flawed team in a weak division, ceding the AL Pennant to one of three teams in the East. The main hang-up for most people seems to be the starting pitching. Personally, I'm liking the possibility of Lee, Carmona, Huff, Laffey, and Westbrook more and more (how long it takes that rotation to shape up is another matter). So what if we didn't re-sign Sabathia? How many Cy Youngs has the rest of the American League won the last two years? It's Carmona's turn to win the CY this year anyway.

As long as the Tribe can get solid innings out of their top three starters, I think the array of young arms will fall into place to fill out the rest of the rotation. While there may be risk in riding the bullpen too heavily, this relief corps has the potential to dominate the final three innings. The depth and strength of the bullpen could go a long way in smoothing the anticipated speed bumps in carrying so many young hurlers in the rotation. Taken as a whole, the team's pitching is shaping up to be good enough to contend. I certainly wouldn't view it as a liability, not with Lee, Carmona, and Wood leading the charge.

If Cleveland can get any kind of quality pitching this season, I feel that they are primed to do much more than just stumble into the playoffs. Cleveland has its flaws and risks, but they also have the tools to cover any potential holes effectively. In this case, the offense may be a secret weapon of sorts.

In 2007, the Tribe posted a team wOBA of .335 and finished 6th in the AL in runs scored with 811. The following year, Cleveland nearly matched this effort with a .334 wOBA and a 6th best 805 runs scored, despite missing the production of a healthy Hafner and Martinez for the entire season. I was surprised to see such a narrow gap in overall offensive production between 2007 when the offense seemed to fire on all cylinders, and 2008 when it felt like the lineup just couldn't be trusted on any given day. Amazingly, Wedge was able to squeeze some sort of production from the 110 different lineups utilized in 2008 (compared to a more stable 81 in 2007). At some point, out of the 166 at-bats given to Dellucci at DH (second only to a limited Hafner), a nasty sophomore slump from Asdrubal, a .753 OPS out of the starting first baseman, and the fact that the backup catcher had more home runs than the third baseman and two primary DH's combined, Cleveland was only six runs off the pace from a year ago.

Cleveland Team Offense: 2006-2008

Year	OBP	SLG	OPS	wOBA	Team RS (AL Rank)	Team RA	Run Diff.
2006	.349	.457	.806	.346	870 (2nd)	782	88
2007	.343	.428	.771	.335	811 (6th)	704	107
2008	.339	.424	.763	.334	805 (6th)	761	44

Obviously nothing's for certain, but I think Cleveland has a shot at cracking the top three in runs scored again. Cleveland didn't have to sign any big names to improve their offense, all they needed was to get healthy and watch the capabilities of their in-house players continue to grow. Peralta had his best season since 2005, finishing second among AL shortstops in wOBA and first in HR (or 4th among third basemen, depending on how you view him). I'm fairly confident that 2008 was no fluke for Peralta and he will continue to be one of the team's best hitters.

A renewed Victor Martinez will anchor the middle of the order once again, relegating Garko's disappointing bat to the bench. If Sizemore is the sparkplug for the offense, Martinez represents the pistons (I'm not very good with analogies). Getting back the captain and team batting champ for three of the past four seasons will obviously provide a huge boost to the offense and give Wedge one less unknown to deal with when structuring the lineup.

This may finally be the year we see Martinez shift into more of a platoon, or even backup role in catching. Shoppach has earned the right to be an everyday starter and with Martinez at first base most of the time, Shoppach will have the opportunity to build on his AL-leading .517 slugging percentage among catchers. A healthy Martinez at first base improves the team on both offense (fewer AB's for Garko, more for Shoppach) and defense (Shoppach is above average behind the dish).

Shin-Soo Choo is a bit of a wild card in that he's never been healthy and had a starting gig at the same time. Choo played out of his mind last season, posting 28 doubles, 14 homers, and an elite .946 OPS over 370 PA. I'm being cautiously optimistic about Choo, since there's a slim chance he'll produce those types of numbers over a full season without a big dose of luck. It's difficult to determine what Choo will actually do as a starter, since his only two Major League stints with at least 150 PA had deceiving BABIP's attached to them. In 2006, Choo had an .812 OPS in 179 PA with a .394 BABIP, while his 2008 BABIP was .373. That's an awfully high occurrence of balls falling in for hits. For comparison, Manny Ramirez had a .373 BABIP to go with his 1.031 OPS last season.

Then again, one thing I've heard multiple times about Choo is how good he is at driving the ball to the gap. It'd be great if I was wrong, but I doubt Choo is capable of posting Manny numbers consistently. With the exception of his SLG, Choo's Major (.291/.377/.493) and Minor (.301/.388/.460) league lines match up nicely. A more reasonable expectation could be for Choo to land somewhere around an .870 OPS (CHONE only has him at .800, but this seems low). Even if he experiences a steep regression, Choo will still be wielding a very strong bat.

Combine the above with Mark DeRosa's OBP in the two-hole, an anticipated rebound from Cabrera, and LaPorta and Brantley in reserve (I'm counting down the days until we cut Dellucci and one of these guys gets the call) and the pieces for a potent offense start to fall into place. Besides Tampa Bay, does any other AL team stand to improve on offense as much as Cleveland? Boston got slightly worse after Manny left, New York added Texiera while the rest of the team continues to age (although they've compensated for this by buying a new pitching staff), and no one in the Central has made any major changes. On paper, Cleveland's offense is flat-out dangerous.

In order to reach their full potential as a truly elite offense, the Tribe will need a come-back season from Travis Hafner. Cleveland was unable to find a suitable replacement for the ailing Hafner last season, finishing with the third worst DH production in the AL. The offense was able to tread water because of unexpected contributions from the likes of Choo and Shoppach, but the lack of an effective DH will only cause more grief for Cleveland. Production from the DH spot has declined steadily right along with the health of Hafner's shoulder.

Cleveland DH Production

Year	HR	OBP	SLG	OPS	wOBA (Rank)	wRC (Rank)
2006	45	.409	.600	1.009	.418 (1st)	136 (2nd)
2007	25	.384	.453	.837	.359 (5th)	102 (5th)
2008	17	.325	.390	.715	.311 (12th)	72 (12th)

It's no coincidence that the team scored 870 runs (second only to New York's 930) the last time Hafner was truly healthy in 2006. Hafner had a career year in '06, slugging 42 HR with a 179 OPS+. The 2007 season saw a steep decline across the board for Hafner and while he was still effective at driving in runs from the three-hole, the apparent discomfort and lack of pop in Hafner's swing foreshadowed the elbow and shoulder injuries that would plague him throughout 2008.

Even with a sub-par 2007 season compared to his 2005-2006 run, Hafner provided quality production and was still among the top five DH's in the league. Hafner's erratic performance turned out to be more than just a slump though and the pain in his shoulder only grew more pronounced once he returned to action in April 2008. In an interview with Anthony Castrovince, Hafner admitted that "[he'd] go out to have a meal and [the] shoulder would burn just from eating, it would wear [the] shoulder out." Even a simple weight lifting routine became an epic undertaking.

After three months on the disabled list trying to strengthen his right shoulder, Hafner returned to Major League action in September only to have the pain and limited mobility return. Hafner had arthroscopic surgery as soon as the season ended to clean out the shoulder joint. To make sure the effects of the surgery stuck, Hafner took up a new training regimen this offseason. He reportedly lost 10 pounds and developed a leaner upper-body in an effort to boost his bat speed to its former level.

When dealing with an injury this severe (he must have been really hurting if he couldn't even lift a fork without pain), odds are the effects were present well before the start of the 2008 season. Only time will tell how much of Hafner's 2007 season was connected to the lingering effects of his slowly weakening shoulder, but there had to have been some serious issues that were either chalked up to a slump, annual wear and tear, or were misdiagnosed in some way. I'm encouraged by the fact that the main problem turned out to be the shoulder and not the chronic right elbow that has troubled Hafner in the past. Hopefully this is the first and last time Hafner has a problem with the shoulder now that it's been surgically repaired.

I'm not ignoring the fact that Hafner's doctor was unable to point to a specific source for the shoulder issues. However, since I wouldn't know how to interpret a more detailed medical report even if I had one, the best I can do is to trust the team's judgement here. Hafner was well into his 2007 slump before the team offered him a long-term contract extension. Why would Cleveland do that if they knew Hafner had even a hint of something that could render him ineffective down the road? It's one thing to have leverage over a slumping player, it's another to take such a significant risk purely for the sake of said leverage. Given how cautious the franchise is about committing salary and how thorough team physicals supposedly are, it doesn't make any sense for Cleveland to willingly give $57 million to a guy with a potentially chronic, debilitating injury.

I think we've heard the last of Hafner's shoulder issues. Hafner isn't the type of player content with just collecting a paycheck on the DL, he's extremely competitive and seems to take it personally when he can't contribute to the team. How often do you hear of a designated hitter committing to a new offseason conditioning program? The dedication and work ethic are there, but Cleveland had better hope they were correct about Hafner's health when they signed him to that extension. The financial repercussions from a $47 million, lame-duck DH would be severe for a small-market team like Cleveland.

Reports out of Goodyear have Hafner making steady progress with his hitting program. Hafner's surgery rehab schedule caused him to come into Spring Training a week or two behind his teammates, relegating him to the indoor batting cages until he became comfortable swinging a bat again. After passing the test with several successful outings at regular batting practice Hafner may get the green light to play in Friday's exhibition game against Milwaukee. In the meantime, he sparred with Cliff Lee in a simulated game, marking the first time Hafner has faced live pitching at camp.

Tribe skipper Eric Wedge indicated modest expectations for the lefty slugger. Unlike in the past, Hafner won't be expected to lead the offense. It's crucial that the coaching staff keeps Hafner on an even keel (to borrow another Wedgism) so that he doesn't press and start to dig himself a hole early on. Being healthy will go a long way in boosting his confidence, but the biggest obstacle to overcome in getting back on track could actually be Hafner himself if he tries to do too much right away.

If the re-acclimation process goes slowly for Hafner, Cleveland will have plenty of backup until he can adjust. A likely scenario is that Wedge starts Hafner out lower in the order and allows him to work his way up as he (hopefully) continues to get stronger. Plan B would be to have Garko platoon at DH temporarily. Look for Choo and Peralta to pick up the slack in the fourth and fifth spots behind Martinez. Actually, here's what I would expect to be the Opening Day lineup:

1.) Sizemore (L)

2.) DeRosa (R)

3.) Martinez (S)

4.) Choo (L)

5.) Peralta (R)

6.) Hafner (L)

7.) Shoppach (R)

8.) Francisco (R)

9.) Cabrera (S)

I've always been a fan of Wedge's "one through nine" approach to running the offense and I think this mantra will be more prevalent than ever. If all (or even most) goes according to plan, there will be few easy outs from top to bottom. The offense still doesn't have much speed (although Choo, Francisco, and Cabrera at least provide options for the occasional steal, hit & run, etc. beyond just Sizemore), but much of the lineup can still rake the ball. Cleveland finished second in the AL in doubles last year with 339 and has had at least seven players in double-digit homer figures the past two seasons. They could have easily had a second straight year with at least five 20-homer players if Choo and Martinez had played a full season.

The fact that the Tribe's power numbers tend to come from unorthodox positions (like catcher and center field) and are more evenly distributed throughout the lineup will help siphon more pressure away from the former team leader in homers. Doubles and walks should be the basis of Hafner's attack. If he can regain his patience at the plate and make solid contact the home runs should come naturally with that punishing left-handed swing.

Again, perhaps the best news for both Hafner and Cleveland is that he doesn't have to have a monster season for it to be considered a success (yes, I know how much he's getting paid, but I think the team is more concerned with him using this season to fully re-establish himself for the remainder of his contract). Likewise, the team doesn't need to rely on him producing a .300 average with 40 taters to achieve a potent offense. Both Bill James and CHONE project Hafner a bit worse than I expect him to be, but it's possible I'm being overly optimistic in the first place. Based on my imaginary projection system I could see Hafner finishing with 29 HR, 90 BB, .288 AVG, .400 OBP, .490 SLG, and an .890 OPS. Since I basically just estimated that from his 2005 and 2007 seasons off the top of my head, I wouldn't take that prediction to your fantasy draft. Still, I don't think an .890 OPS is out of the question for 2009.

The bottom-line for Hafner this season will be how he fits into the offense as a whole. If he is able to drive in 100 runners and draw 80-100+ walks like he has in the past I would consider that a very strong season coming off a serious injury. Who knows, maybe he'll surprise everyone and this will be the year Pronk returns.

Francisco vs. Dunn

2009-02-09T23:38:00.003-05:00

It's no secret that the free agent market has been down this off-season, leaving many All-Star caliber players unemployed in the first week of February. Teams have been more cautious about adding to their payrolls and handing out long-term contracts than in the past due to the uncertainty brought on by the economy. Without a reliable revenue stream from the fans, merchandising, and corporate sponsors, most teams have limited their free agent acquisitions to one or two year deals at bargain prices. While the Yankees have proven themselves recession-proof, small and mid-market teams are feeling the crunch.

Jason Giambi's one year, $5.25 million deal with Oakland and Pat Burrell's two year, $16 million deal with Tampa Bay should turn out to be excellent bargains in terms of offensive value for the money spent. Two productive sluggers like Giambi and Burrell wouldn't normally take significant pay cuts in free agency, but they were wise to recognize the tough situation most teams are in and chose to take a short-term, guaranteed paycheck instead of looking for a big contract that just wasn't there. These two contracts may have set the market for players like Bobby Abreu and Adam Dunn, neither of whom has found any offers to their liking. Dunn is rumored to be seeking a four year deal in the $50+ million range, but with Spring Training quickly approaching, a renewed awareness of defensive value around the league, and an apparent lack of serious suitors it seems doubtful that Dunn will get more than a fraction of that.

What does this mean for the Tribe in 2009? Not much. The team added nearly $19 million to their existing payroll and have already exceeded their planned budget for this season. Cleveland will not be making any more additions to the payroll unless a significant contract is moved first (which won't happen either). So even though there are several quality free agents available at steeply reduced prices, Cleveland will not be signing any of them. The question I'd like to answer is whether or not Cleveland should add one of these players. Would Adam Dunn be enough of an upgrade over Ben Francisco in left field to justify the additional money spent? First I'd like to look at what each player has to offer before moving on to a direct comparison.

Francisco on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2007	66	.261	5	3	0.16	.303	.500	-.04
2008	447	.270	32	15	0.47	.332	.438	3.2

Ben Francisco had a solid overall season in 2008, slugging 32 doubles and 15 homers behind a .266 / .332 / .438 line. Unfortunately, a strong start was overshadowed by a miserable September where Francisco hit .188 with a season low .619 OPS in 81 PA. Francisco may have posted an .832 OPS before the All Star break, but that final month really drained the life out of what had been a strong rookie season. The late season slump also shook the club's confidence in Francisco, leaving him with something to prove heading into his second Major League season.

While the numbers suggest an average offensive performance in 2008 (OPS+ 100), Francisco was able to build upon the 66 PA he compiled in 2007. The last time Francisco faced ML pitching, he had only a 0.16 BB/K ratio and .303 OBP on a shaky .350 BABIP in 66 PA. Last season, Francisco elevated his BB/K ratio to 0.47 (his career BB/K in the minors is 0.56), had a .332 OBP, and saw his BABIP move to a more reliable .301. Ben also featured an improved plate discipline, becoming more selective in the types of pitches to attack. He swung at pitches outside the strike zone 8.4% less often and made contact with the ball in 81% of his at-bats. These are two excellent areas to see improvement for a developing hitter. Francisco had a better time recognizing which pitches to lay-off and was able to square up more often on hittable pitches.

Unlike David Dellucci, the team can pencil in the right-handed Francisco regardless of the opposing pitcher. Francisco had a .794 OPS against lefties and a .762 OPS against righties in 2008. Away from the Jake was a different story though, as Ben had a 109 point difference in his home and road OPS'. This is one aspect of Ben's game that will have to dramatically improve if he hopes to keep pace ahead of the prospects in Buffalo. Matt LaPorta and Michael Brantley will be challenging for Francisco's job from the start, so he really can't afford to go through a month-long slump like he has in the past. The good news, at least for Francisco, is that with Dellucci confined to the bench (or the waiver wire, mercifully) and the Tribe's Dynamic Duo still toiling in AAA he should have plenty of room to breathe at the start of the season. The bad news for Francisco is that Mark DeRosa is a more than adequate outfielder and may be asked to step in if Francisco struggles.

Regardless of whether benching Francisco for Jamey Carroll (who would take over at third with DeRosa in left) is the best move, it is definitely a move Wedge has been inclined to make in the past. Francisco will have some slack to work with, but the team does have other options if he stumbles at the plate. Given the sense of urgency displayed by Cleveland in retooling for 2008, it's clear the team knows how much is riding on this season. It's not like Cleveland has been exuding confidence in their outfield situation with the likes of Garko and Barfield under consideration for Spring Training reps beyond the diamond. An early summer call-up for one of their stud outfield prospects is not out of the question, even if it defers from the normal timetable given to such prospects.

I understand the argument against Francisco seeing any notable growth as a player because of his age; perfectly sound reasoning. At 26, he's not your typical sophomore and is probably near his ceiling as a player, if he isn't already there. I'm not expecting any major leaps in his game, but it's not unheard of for players with the right tools to break through at an advanced age if given the opportunity. Look at Casey Blake's career, he didn't even become a ML starter until age 29 and went on to post several solid seasons for the Tribe. Starting third baseman Mark DeRosa is another example of a player posting the best numbers of their career at a later age. We're not talking about a contract extension, just whether or not Ben's capable of holding down the fort until LaPorta and company arrive in 2009.

Ben did not put up any big numbers in his rookie season, but he was never expected to be a major offensive threat. Instead, he showed he still has the tools to succeed as a hitter in the Majors. Now that he has a full year of experience to go with a refined plate approach, Francisco may be poised for an even better campaign with the Tribe. If he can avoid the second-half slump he suffered in 2008, I think there is a strong chance Francisco will see at least modest gains at the plate.

Francisco on Defense

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2007	LF	102	26	21	17	.810	9 (34.6)	29.0
2008	LF	643	150	136	122	.897	28 (18.6)	-0.3

PO = putouts; BIZ = balls in zone; RZR = revised zone rating; OOZ = outside of zone; UZR/150 = ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games

Francisco more than pulled his weight in the outfield, displaying good range and a strong arm on defense. In terms of UZR/150 (that's ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games), Francisco was above average compared to most ML left fielders with at least 500 innings. His -0.3 mark (he basically broke even in terms of runs his defense cost the team) is significantly better than the next lowest player in Carlos Lee (-2.0), while most of the players with positive UZRs possess exceptional range (Francisco wouldn't be as far from the top if it weren't for transplants like Carl Crawford setting up shop in left). Somewhere well above Lee and on the periphery of the speedy outfielders sounds like a fair estimate of Francisco's range in left.

While he doesn't cover as much ground as some, Francisco does cast a fairly wide net in the field. Francisco's OOZ (out of zone, or the number of outs made by a fielder outside his normal defensive zone) shows that 18.6% of his total putouts were made beyond the expected defensive zone for a left fielder. This is a very respectable range, even though left field is a less demanding position than say, center field. Also, according to THT's Outfield Arms metric Francisco would have saved 3.1 runs over 200 opportunities through kills (throwing a runner out) and holds (preventing an eligible runner from advancing further). For comparison, I a rating around 1.0 run saved is par for the course, making Francisco above average in both range and arm strength.

Overall, Francisco is an asset on defense and has had no trouble holding down his position.

Dunn on Defense

Adam Dunn was one of the last free agents I would have expected to be available in February, yet there he is, unsigned. Now that General Managers are placing a higher premium on defense, statues like Dunn have seen their overall market value plummet. Why some team hasn't dropped a bag of cash in Dunn's lap to be their DH is beyond me though. I had read a while back that Dunn was insistent on continuing to play in the outfield (probably not a smart negotiating move), though he may have dropped this request since then. Plus, I fail to see how Dunn could turn down a multi-million dollar contract at this point just so he can continue to exercise his worst attribute as a ballplayer (props to Dunn for having the right attitude and not wanting to quit on defense, but it isn't terribly practical in this case). So even though moving to first base is a possibility (he has 97 career starts there) and would take some of the pressure off Dunn's lack of mobility, he wants no part of the infield on a full-time basis.

Did Dunn really do more harm than good by making all those starts in left field? Below are Dunn's defensive stats from the last three seasons:

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2006	LF	1321	279	270	237	.878	42 (15.0)	-11.0
2007	LF	1189	244	259	214	.826	31 (12.7)	-16.3
2008*	LF	915	191	179	161	.899	30 (15.7)	-13.5

*I only included Dunn's innings with Cincy in 2008 because it would have been tricky to calculate a combined value with Cincy and Arizona for each stat. The sample size for Arizona was small enough to not worry about anyway.

According to his UZR/150, Dunn cost his team 13.5 runs over 915 innings playing in left field. To give those -13.5 runs some perspective, among ML left fielders with at least 500 innings logged, only Chase Headley (that's a lot of ground to cover in Petco), Pat Burrell (now a DH), Jack Cust (kinda is a DH), Jason Bay (wasn't expecting him to be here), Delmon Young (first year in the Metrodome, should bounce back), and Luis Gonzalez (at 42 years old, I'll cut him some slack) were worse. There's no disputing that Dunn had a pretty rough time fielding his position in 2008. The same trend pops up in previous seasons as well (the annual variation shown is normal for defensive stats, he still hits double digits each year though). Also, who would have thought a guy as strong as Dunn would have a noodle-arm? Ok, that may not be a fair description, but he does struggle to keep runners in check. During his time in left field in 2008, Dunn's throwing actually cost his team 6.0 runs by itself.

Interestingly enough, Dunn's RZR (revised zone rating, or the proportion of balls hit into a fielder's zone that he successfully converts into an out) and OOZ are comparable to Francisco's. Francisco made a larger percentage of plays outside his defensive zone (18.6% to Dunn's 15.7%) but performed about the same as Dunn when fielding balls hit within the left field zone. This doesn't seem right at all. In fact, I can guarantee that in a fan poll, Francisco would display a better defensive reputation than Dunn.

Based purely on what I saw from Francisco last season, he's at the very least an average defender, while the stats cited earlier suggest he's above average in terms of runs saved. Meanwhile, Dunn's reputation certainly precedes him in terms of defensive deficiency. This is a good example of why empirical evidence is still way ahead of any current defensive metrics. It's cool to be able to quantify a player's range in terms of runs, but it's still a good idea to take those numbers with a grain of salt. Defensive stats are still being tweaked and refined by people much smarter than I.

Considering how many intricate variables go into the UZR formula (how hard a ball is hit, where it's hit, park factors, and the type of pitcher on the mound to name a few), it's not too surprising to see it produce a drastically different assessment compared to the revised zone ratings. Factor in a more reliable reputation for UZR and I think I'll stick with that in terms of quantifying each player's defensive value. Based on empirical evidence and the best available defensive stats, Ben Francisco is obviously a far superior defender to Adam Dunn.

Dunn on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2006	683	.304	24	40	0.58	.365	.490	19.8
2007	632	.300	27	40	0.61	.386	.554	36.2
2008	651	.299	23	40	0.74	.386	.513	29.7

The consistency with which Dunn produces the same offensive numbers each year is almost comical. Seriously, who hits exactly 40 home runs for four straight seasons? Dunn specializes in hitting for power, drawing walks, and...that's basically it. The left-handed slugger has posted top five ML totals in both HR and BB in four of the past five seasons. Over eight Major League seasons, his career OBP is an outstanding .381 (sonnets have been written in tribute to Dunn's OBP). There's really not much to say about Dunn's bat that hasn't already been said. As far as launching taters and drawing walks, Dunn has been one of the best in baseball for several years running.

It may be foolish to wonder what the consequences of a Dunn power-outage would be since we're only discussing the short term. However, I'm curious just how big a factor the long ball is compared to all those walks in the context of Dunn's overall offense. If for some reason (a new ballpark, adjusting to a new league, or plain bad luck for example) Dunn sees a decline in his home run ability, how much of his value would he retain? Dunn does not possess much speed and has never been much of a doubles hitter, despite a consistently strong slugging percentage (obviously his SLG is supported mostly by homers). In 2008, his 23 doubles did not even crack the top 150 among all ML players. Excluding home runs, Dunn has never collected many extra base hits and has only two seasons (2004, 2005) with more than 30 doubles and at least 500 at-bats.

One way to determine how heavy Dunn's homers are within his overall offensive value is to consider equivalent average (EqA). EqA (set to the same scale as batting average, where .260 is the league average) is a good bet for evaluating pure offensive production in this case since it does not give homers a weighted advantage like OPS and its refined cousin, wOBA. Looking at the formula for raw EqA, (H + TB + 1.5*(BB + HBP + SB) + SH + SF) divided by (AB + BB + HBP + SH + SF + CS + SB) you can see that hits, total bases, walks, and stolen bases are among the most significant variables.

The fact that Dunn lacks much speed on the bases, plays in a hitter-friendly ballpark, and has a dearth of hits would have seriously dragged on Dunn's offensive numbers if it weren't for his ability to advance via base on balls. Dunn had about a .300 EqA the past two seasons, meaning he was a very valuable hitter despite the several factors working against him. As it turns out, all those walks would still carry the day in the event Dunn falls short of his annual 40 homer mark. Even though he's had a top five strikeout total every season of his career, Dunn still possesses the plate discipline to lay off pitches outside the zone and work the count. Dunn can get away with batting .236 since he reaches base nearly 40% of the time, regardless (you can criticize a player like Dunn all you want, just please don't base your argument on batting average).

Amazingly, Dunn only swung at pitches outside the zone 17.2% of the time in 2008 (this is quite good). On the other hand, he made contact with just 71.8% of the pitches he offered at last season. This is a pretty poor contact rate although it is in line with other sluggers like Thome and Howard who have a tendency to swing for the fences (unlike Dunn, they swing at balls outside the zone a lot more). Finally, pitchers showed a healthy respect for Dunn's power by throwing him a strike just 45.5% of the time. Dunn is in good company as far as striking fear in the hearts of scrub pitchers; only Josh Hamilton, Prince Fielder, and Vlad Guerrero (a notorious free-swinger) saw fewer pitches in the strike zone in 2008.

These trends highlight Dunn's all-or-nothing approach at the plate. While he is very good at identifying pitches not to hit (those outside the strike zone), his swing appears to have some major holes in it. Like the aforementioned Thome and Howard, Dunn usually attacks with a big power stroke to drive the ball as far as possible. This type of long, loaded swing will produce a lot of hard fly balls, but it also leaves the hitter vulnerable and unable to protect the plate as well as hitters with more compact swings who tend to focus on just making solid contact most of the time (singles and doubles). Dunn's approach is on the extreme end for power hitters, resulting in maximum power and minimal precision.

While some may argue otherwise, I don't see Dunn's approach as an issue. The majority of hitters are forced to make the tradeoff between crushing the ball or slapping a single when they come up to the plate anyway. Only a few elite players can consistently produce a true balance in their offensive attack (like Manny and Pujols). In other words, don't expect a guy who hits 40 homers to bat .300 in the same season. Both are valuable in their own way, but you can't expect to have the best of both worlds.

One could argue that Dunn needs the intimidation factor associated with those punishing home runs to maintain his high walk rate. Pitchers are obviously reluctant to throw strikes out of fear he will launch one into the bleachers. This theory is more relevant to a long term projection though, since the the 28-year old Dunn won't be experiencing a physical decline in power anytime soon. It would take a serious drop in power potential before pitchers decided to regularly challenge Dunn within the strike zone. Therefore, Dunn's walk rate won't be going away anytime soon. If he were to experience a decline in homers, this would still impact the bottom line for the team that signs him, bringing us back to the earlier question (sorry, I got a little off track).

What would happen once Dunn moved out of Cincinnati's home ballpark for the first time in his career? Dunn's numbers had to have benefited from all those seasons playing in a hitter friendly ballpark. According to ESPN, Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati had a 1.069 park factor in 2008, making it the seventh most hitter-friendly park in the Majors. Chase Field in Arizona, Dunn's post-trade home park, had the second highest factor at 1.135, possibly explaining why his performance did not suffer from the change in venue last season.

If Dunn were to spend half of his at-bats in Cleveland, there is a strong possibility he would experience some adverse effects. Progressive Field had a .995 overall park factor, but really suppressed home runs. Out of 30 ballparks, Cleveland had a HR park factor of .824; third lowest in the Majors (only Kaufmann Stadium and Petco Park saw fewer taters, in addition to having lower overall park factors than Progressive Field). Even if it's only a minor consideration, Dunn's performance will likely reflect his new home to some degree.

Wins and Salary

For me, the choice between Francisco and Dunn is contingent on the gap between Francisco's defensive value and Dunn's offensive value. As an above-average defender boasting at least an average bat, I expected Francisco to match up favorably to Dunn, whose atrocious defense cancels out quite a bit of his advantage on offense. To quantify these two factors I used FanGraphs' spiffy value wins table, replicated below.

Francisco FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2007	-0.3	2.4	2.2	-1.3	3.0	0.3	$1.2
2008	3.7	-4.3	16.6	-6.3	9.7	1.0	$4.3

Dunn FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2006	17.9	-12.4	22.8	-7.5	20.7	2.0	$7.4
2007	34.5	-14.9	21.1	-7.2	33.4	3.3	$13.3
2008	27.4	-22.8	21.7	-8.0	18.3	1.8	$8.2

For a detailed overview of how these numbers were calculated, click here and scroll down. The values most relevant to this analysis are Batting, Fielding, and Value Wins. Batting depicts the player's wRAA (offensive runs above average, this time adjusted for the home ballpark and league) while fielding is total UZR (both values were included in the player tables earlier). The Position adjustment accounts for the degree of difficulty for a player's defensive position. For example, left field is a much less demanding position to field than shortstop, so left fielders have a -7.5 run penalty compared to the +7.5 run bonus a shortstop receives (this stems from the idea that a player who can hit at a high level and field an elite defensive position is that much more valuable). The Replacement value addresses the monetary value of wins and a player's time on the field, as opposed to a lesser bench player (the concept of replacement level and calculating salaries can get complicated quick, so I'll let FanGraphs do the talking if you're so inclined).

Assuming positive values are good and negative values are bad for a player's value, the final formula plays out as basic math: wRAA + UZR + Position + Replacement = Value Runs.

As expected, Dunn's superior batting value is largely canceled out by his negative fielding value, producing 18.3 runs above replacement for the 2008 season. FanGraphs makes the run total easier to interpret by converting it into wins using a team's Pythagorean value (calculates a team's expected win-loss record based on its runs scored/against rate). Assuming roughly 10 runs equals 1 win, Dunn was responsible for 1.8 wins during his time with Cincinnati and Arizona.

For Francisco, his batting and fielding values are nearly a wash. I only cited Francisco's innings in LF earlier, while the UZR value shown here depicts his time at every position. Since Francisco was not as strong defensively at the other outfield positions, his fielding value takes a hit (this also results in a lower positional penalty than an exclusive left fielder). Francisco produced 9.7 runs above replacement overall, which translated into 1.0 win for the Tribe in 2008.

Note the difference in innings (288) and plate appearances (152) between Francisco and Dunn. This gives Dunn an advantage in terms of total wins (more chances to contribute results in more partial wins credited). As it stands, Francisco has about a 25% deficit to Dunn in total chances (innings + PA) which roughly equals .25 wins that Francisco never had the opportunity to earn. According to the numbers, Dunn was worth just half a win more (.55) than Francisco in 2008. That's a surprisingly slim difference considering the gap in experience and salary between the two outfielders. To be fair, Dunn did produce 3.3 wins in 2007 and saw his 2008 fielding runs suffer slightly from 128 innings at first base (-12.5 positional penalty), so unless Francisco takes a step forward offensively (or Dunn loses a step defensively) that .55 win difference has plenty of potential to grow.

Finally, assuming each win cost a team about $4.5 million in 2008, Dunn's calculated monetary value was $8.2 million while his actual salary was $13 million. Francisco holds a major advantage in this department and posted a sizable surplus in terms of his calculated value of $4.3 million and actual salary (close to the league minimum of $390,000 due to his brief service time).

I don't view Adam Dunn as enough of an upgrade to justify the money he's demanding (whether or not he gets anything resembling $12.5 million a year is another story). Whoever signs him is probably going to end up losing a few million dollars in undelivered value, although that team will hopefully be filling a dire need. Cleveland, on the other hand, does not have a legitimate need in left field due to their envious outfield depth in the high minors and flexibility within the Major League club. If Cleveland were to sign Dunn, they'd be paying a premium for an extra win, maybe two, in the form of a crowded roster, a downgraded defense, and even less financial flexibility than they had before (namely, none).

The fine line between Francisco and Dunn's overall value for 2008 showed that Cleveland would only be making an incremental upgrade for what amounts to a luxury. Dunn would have to go absolutely nuts at the plate to even begin to justify his atrocious defense and expected salary. Since there's no way Dunn is going to match his career year from 2004, his true offensive value will continue to be negated to the point of being a waste. So much of his overall value dies on the field it's like watching money get flushed down a toilet. I don't want to diminish Dunn's offensive prowess, but he really is costing himself potential salary by refusing to become a DH. At this point the market seems to have cooled so much I don't think even a concession to DH full time could salvage this winter for Dunn and his agent.

Which brings us to yet another issue with Dunn. Without a DH vacancy, there is no way for Cleveland to capitalize on Dunn's greatest asset, not to mention how idiotic it would be to have $24 million wrapped up in dual designated hitters. They were far better off spending that extra $12 million on filling holes at closer and third base (big difference between filling an actual hole and merely upgrading a position; we didn't have a real closer or third baseman until recently) rather than giving it to a free agent outfielder. Dunn is a few tools short of the full set and should not be grouped with or paid like the games truly elite players.

Cleveland absolutely made the right move in going with an inexpensive, low risk, high reward youth movement in left and watching their wisely spent funds (a.k.a. Wood and DeRosa) produce dividends elsewhere on the roster.

UZR, Value Wins formula, and associated stats taken from FanGraphs.

Outfield Arm ratings, RZR, and OOZ taken from The Hardball Times.

EqA taken from Baseball Prospectus.

Southpaw Saviors?

2009-01-23T23:37:00.007-05:00

In my last post, I highlighted the Carl Pavano signing and expressed concern about the state of the Tribe's starting rotation for 2009. While I'm still worried about a pitching staff sans-Sabathia, I think I did a poor job of backing up my opinion. I summed up my thoughts as such:

"No one behind Lee and Carmona can truly be counted on to a.) pitch effectively for most of the season b.) stay healthy or c.) not pitch like a rookie who is in way over his head."

This is a pretty broad statement without much evidence behind it. Amazingly, no one called me on it, but I think these issues warrant further investigation.

What should we expect from Aaron Laffey?

Laffey started the 2008 season in Buffalo as an emergency sixth starter for the Major League club, but was soon called to action after Jake Westbrook suffered a rib injury in mid-April. With Westbrook's subsequent elbow injury (and season-ending surgery) it seemed like Laffey wouldn't be making that long drive to Buffalo anytime soon. Laffey provided the Tribe with an exceptional backup to Westbrook and initially improved on his 2007 debut.

Year	Age	Level	IP (GS)	ERA	WHIP	K/9	BB/9	GB/FB	LD%	Strike%
2007	22	AAA	96.1 (15)	3.08	1.16	7.01	2.15	N/A	N/A	N/A
		MLB	49.1 (9)	4.56	1.34	4.56	2.19	3.32	18.8	62.2
2008	23	AAA	61.2 (11)	4.38	1.46	6.86	2.63	N/A	N/A	N/A
		MLB	93.2 (16)	4.23	1.43	4.13	2.98	1.69	18.7	60.8

With the exception of two forgettable starts against New York (5.2 IP, 4 ER) and at Texas (5 IP, 8 ER), Laffey was very effective in his first 11 starts. The young southpaw averaged 6.23 innings per start with a 2.83 ERA, 1.22 WHIP, 1.57 K/BB, and 1.60 GB/FB ratio over that span. At some point during his final six starts, Laffey started to experience difficulties with his throwing elbow. He got hit harder, surrendered more walks, and lasted fewer innings resulting in a 1.40 point jump in his ERA. After lasting just 3.2 innings in Seattle and getting torched for 8 ER in 4 IP in L.A., Cleveland sent Laffey back to Buffalo to smooth out some wrinkles in his mechanics. It's unclear to what degree, if any, Laffey's elbow was impeding his delivery at this point, but he did not fare much better in Buffalo, posting a 4.38 ERA and 1.46 WHIP in 61.2 total innings in AAA that year. Those last two starts basically trashed Laffey's overall numbers. In his 14 starts before the All Star Break, Laffey had a 3.45 ERA, 1.27 WHIP, and 1.48 K/BB.

Despite struggling with his delivery and/or a strained elbow (again, I can't say for sure), several of Laffey's key peripherals from 2008 were still comparable to 2007. Even with a rough stretch in his final six starts, Laffey's line drive percentage and number of pitches thrown for strikes saw little change from last season. This is important because it shows Laffey's pitches were still fairly effective and batters were not driving his pitches any more than usual.

It's interesting that Laffey threw only 1.4% fewer strikes in 2008, yet his BB/9 rate jumped 0.79 points. The best explanation I can think of for that is that Laffey did not challenge batters to expand the strike zone as often as before. In 2007, a batter may have been more likely to offer at a breaking ball on its way out of the zone resulting in a ground or foul ball (both tallied as strikes), rather than a called ball. This theory is encouraged by a 6.4% drop in O-Swing%, or the amount of time a batter swung at a pitch outside the strike zone.

With all the reports of Laffey's delivery needing some work last season, it seems pretty likely that his pitches were not experiencing the same movement as before. If Laffey was unable to drive his breaking ball through the desired trajectory on a consistent basis, this could explain why his walk rate went up and his pitches failed to fool as many batters. Flatter or more erratic pitches could also lead to fewer fooled batters flailing into groundball outs, at least partly explaining the steep drop in GB/FB ratio. I'm fairly confident that any issues Laffey had with his pitches were directly related to his strained elbow. One good sign amidst Laffey's control issues was that his pitch velocity saw only negligible changes between the two seasons.

The key to Laffey's success is his ability to induce groundball outs. The only variables that changed since 2007 were the health of Laffey's elbow, his command, and his groundball production. Laffey's pitch selection, velocity, and strategy basically stayed the same. The fact that a specific, integral variable (the elbow) can be traced back to the other two troublesome variables is encouraging.

It's easy to forget just how few consecutive innings Laffey has logged in the Majors when it feels like (at least to me) he's been such a steady contributor to the team since their playoff run in 2007. Even though his experience and talent give him an edge over his contemporaries, Laffey has still not been guaranteed a spot in the rotation heading into Spring Training (Shapiro has hinted that Laffey is the frontrunner for the job, so this may just be to further competition amongst the lesser candidates). There is still some question as to how Laffey will perform over the course of an entire Major League season. This is certainly a valid point, since no amount of projections or speculation can truly predict how a 23-year old pitcher coming off an injury will perform over 170+ innings. That said, I still feel there's a strong chance Laffey will continue to improve on his two partial seasons.

The issues outlined above are unlikely to follow Laffey into 2009, especially since his delivery issues were caught and corrected early. Cleveland was wise to shut-down Laffey as soon as the elbow strain was diagnosed and has carefully monitored his performance since then. If Laffey's control reverts back to its 2007 form, his walk and groundball rates should go back to normal which will make him much more effective than he has been lately. I don't see any reason why this won't happen next season if Laffey is 100% healthy. I'm not sure if this will be Laffey's breakout season, but I do think he will establish himself as a full-time starter in the Majors. If I were to choose which fourth or fifth starter will go on to log the most innings this season, I would take Laffey over Pavano, Huff, Sowers, and Lewis.

Does Huff have the tools to succeed out of the gate?

Former first-round draft pick, David Huff, is expected to be a strong contender for the final rotation spot out of Spring Training. Huff pitched collegiate ball for two years at UCLA before signing with the Indians in 2006. The California native encountered little resistance in the lower minors and found himself in Buffalo in a little over two seasons. Huff's 2007 season with Kinston was shortened because of a strained ligament in his throwing elbow, but he suffered no ill effects from the elbow in 2008. Below are Huff's stats from the past two seasons:

Year	Age	Level	IP (GS)	ERA	WHIP	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	BABIP	FIP
2007	22	A+	59.2 (11)	2.72	1.21	6.94	2.26	3.07	.302	3.33
2008	23	AA	65.2 (10)	1.92	0.88	8.50	1.92	4.43	.240	2.99
		AAA	80.2 (16)	3.01	1.03	9.04	1.67	5.40	.291	3.15

I really can't find anything to complain about here. Huff must have had great coaches and preparation at UCLA because he hit the ground running in his first full minor league season and never looked back. His strikeout and walk rates improved significantly at each development level, despite having to make the transition from AA to AAA mid-season. In 213.2 career minor league innings, Huff compiled an outstanding 2.70 ERA and 1.07 WHIP. Huff's numbers hold up well on their own, too. When team defense is removed from the equation with FIP, Huff would still have averaged a 3.15 ERA.

Even when Huff appeared to be at risk of stumbling in his first season back from the elbow injury, his talent proved otherwise. A .240 BABIP, like Huff had in 65 innings at AA, would normally indicate a pitcher is playing over his head. Instead, Huff improved across the board after his promotion to AAA, raising his BABIP to a more sustainable .291 in the process. Obviously, that last hurdle between AAA and the Majors is the biggest, but Huff seems as prepared as anyone to make a successful transition.

Despite having just over 200 innings of professional experience, Huff's maturity as a pitcher shines through in his performance. Tony Lastoria describes Huff's abilities:

"Huff is a strike-thrower who has excellent command of his pitches. His fastball consistently clocks in at 88-91 MPH, and his changeup is a plus pitch and ranked one of the best in the country coming into the draft. While he does not overpower hitters, he has unbelievable confidence in his fastball, and commands it well working it to both sides of the plate and to the corners on all four quadrants. He has the best fastball command in the entire system, and is a very polished pitcher. He is aggressive and attacks hitters, and he has a great, athletic delivery which deceives hitters and he repeats it well.

The key to Huff's future will be the development of an effective breaking ball as a third pitch to use against left-handers. He does throw a curveball, but it still needs a lot of work, and his slider is just average."

Huff's lack of a go-to breaking pitch may prove to be a challenge once he starts to face Major League hitting, but those pitches should have improved considerably by the time Spring Training starts (the scouting report I quoted is over a year old at this point). One trait that should serve Huff well in his rookie season is his ability to aggressively attack hitters in all parts of the strike zone.

At first, Huff reminded me of another left-hander who relies heavily on control. Jeremy Sowers' career mirrors Huff's in several ways. Both pitched in college, cruised through the minors, and were primed for their MLB debut by age 23 (assuming Huff joins the team this year). Sowers' career minor league stats are also similar (414 IP, 2.50 ERA, 1.17 WHIP, 8.4 H9, 2.2 BB9, 6.7 K9), except Sowers was never the strikeout pitcher that Huff is. Leading up to his MLB debut, Sowers saw his strikeout rate decline at least a full point at each development level, settling in at 5.0 K/9 over 97.1 IP in 2006. Sowers was able to raise his K rate in two Buffalo stints in 2007 and 2008 to 5.7 and 6.4 respectively, but never duplicated that success in the Majors. Huff followed the opposite path, elevating his K rate by 2.10 points between A+ and AAA.

Also, if Huff's fastball range of 88-91 MPH sounds like something typically associated with "crafty" lefties, it's worth noting that Cliff Lee averaged just 90.5 MPH with his fastball last season. An 89 MPH average doesn't seem so bad for a pitcher who actually has the ability and the guts to challenge hitters on all parts of the plate.

If Huff's strikeout rate distinguishes him from Sowers, how does he compare to past pitching prospects? Below are the career minor league stats for two other left-handed pitchers who eventually stuck in the Majors:

Player	IP	ERA	WHIP	H9	HR9	BB9	K9
C. Lee	427.1	3.37	1.27	7.2	0.8	4.2	10.2
C.C. Sabathia	246.2	3.44	1.30	7.3	0.5	4.4	10.4
D. Huff	213.2	2.70	1.07	7.5	0.7	2.2	8.3

It's interesting to note how Lee and Sabathia made up for a lack of control with high K rates, while Huff had significantly better control with a lower, yet still strong, K rate. This may not mean anything at all, but it's fun to look at.

As far as I'm concerned, Huff doesn't have much left to prove in the minors. It's possible that Sowers will get one last shot at the Majors before the team makes a final decision on him, but it looks like the next wave of prospects has finally caught up to Sowers. Considering Cleveland's fourth starter is Carl "anecdotal adjective" Pavano, they'll need all the pitching depth they can get. However, unless Pavano crashes his Ferrari into the foul pole at Goodyear or something, Huff is a long-shot for the final rotation spot (I'll be surprised if Laffey doesn't get it). The good news is that as soon as Pavano inevitably implodes, the team can simply eat his meager salary and plug in Huff. Until then, Huff will probably be this season's emergency starter in Columbus.

Pavano Adds Cheap Depth to Tribe Rotation

2009-01-10T23:14:00.014-05:00

I had a hunch Cleveland was going to make at least one more signing with whatever meager funds the front office could scrape together. Fortunately, the final signing was prefaced by the general manager stating “the lion's share of our resources have been committed,” so I knew not to get my hopes up. Still, Shapiro is one of the best around at identifying low risk, high reward players, stretching every available dollar, so something had to be up. Who will Shap’s rehab project be in 2009?

Cleveland fans, meet your new left fielder…..Sammy Sosa!

No, just kidding (sorry to anyone who just did a spit-take onto their monitor). Seriously though, Carl Pavano? I know the front office is basically broke at this point, but if we had a significant hole to fill couldn’t we have traded for someone? Please? Oh well, I guess Scott Boras doesn’t accept coupons.

Obviously, I’m not thrilled with this signing, partly because it’s such a crap shoot as to whether Pavano will be effective enough to justify even using him in the rotation. The last time King Carl (apparently this is the moniker Yankee fans bestowed upon him, very distinguished) made at least ten starts in the Major Leagues was when he managed to toss 100 innings over 17 starts with a 4.77 ERA and 1.47 WHIP in 2005. That was by far the most productive season New York wrung out of Pavano during his four year, $38 million contract (your turn, Burnett). Here is Pavano’s body of work over four seasons with New York, not including his minor league rehab starts:

Year	GS	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	HR/9	GB/FB
2005	17	100.0	4.77	1.47	3.11	1.53	1.59
2006	DID NOT PITCH
2007	2	11.1	4.76	1.24	2.00	0.79	1.29
2008	7	34.1	5.77	1.49	1.50	1.31	0.96

I’m not sure why I bothered to add any extra peripherals to the table, since the sample size is either too small or nonexistent for the past three seasons. I’d say the lack of substantial innings from 2006 to 2008 sums up Pavano’s performance as well as anything. Despite enduring a stretch that would have ended the career of most pitchers, Pavano managed to get healthy enough to net a new contract. It seems like Pavano’s mini-comeback over seven starts from August 23 to September 25 played heavily into Shapiro’s decision to choose him over the likes of Mark Mulder, Bartolo Colon, and Freddy Garcia.

Mulder is still trying to get healthy (1.7 IP in 2008) and has struggled with his health just as much as Pavano lately. Colon gave Boston some solid emergency starts, but was back in the minors rehabbing by mid-June. I watched Garcia’s September start against Chicago and his pitches did not look Major League ready, even after rehab. In terms of cheap starting pitchers returning from injuries, Pavano really was the best bet.

Shapiro provided his take on Pavano’s recent activity in an interview on the team’s website:

"This is not a guy you're guessing is going to come back. He made seven starts [in August and September] last year, with no problems. He's in great shape right now. He's strong, fit and highly motivated."

I can understand the potential Shapiro saw based on those seven starts. Again, small sample size, but let’s take a closer look at those starts for lack of better information:

Team	IP	ER	H	BB	HR	K	Strike %	GB/FB
at BAL	5.0	3	7	1	0	5	59.3	2.25
TOR	6.0	1	3	1	0	1	58.3	0.3
at TBR	4.0	3	1	2	1	1	59.4	0.62
at LAA	5.1	5	6	1	2	2	62.1	0.87
TBR	5.1	3	5	2	1	3	61.0	1.42
BAL	5.0	2	6	1	0	2	64.3	1.28
at TOR	3.2	5	8	2	1	1	59.4	1.66

Pavano’s best and only quality start came against Toronto when he posted 1 ER, 3 H, 1 BB, and 1 K over 6 innings. He did manage to provide at least five innings of work in five of the seven starts, but with mixed results. Pavano’s numbers indicate a pretty bland performance, averaging 10.7 hits and 2.6 walks per nine innings with an ERA of 5.77. His other peripherals are much more interesting though.

Even though he averaged over a hit per inning, Pavano improved the percent of pitches he threw for strikes over his first six starts (59.3% to 64.3%). The fact that Pavano was not afraid to attack the zone and stuck to his game plan suggests he at least has some confidence back. Second, according to FanGraphs, Pavano’s O-Swing % of 27.0% (percent of pitches a batter swings at outside the strike zone) and F-Strike % of 55.8% (percent of first pitches thrown for a strike) are stronger than they were in his 2005 season with New York.

Again, the F-Strike % suggests Pavano is willing to be aggressive and attack hitters; good news for a pitcher who tends to rely on location and control to get outs. Unfortunately there isn’t any Pitch f/x data available for Pavano (too few pitches), but if he’s causing batters to swing at his pitches outside the zone at a fair clip I think it’s safe to assume his pitches have some decent life. If Pavano has re-worked his stuff to the point that he can fool batters consistently again, his lack of velocity becomes less of a concern (for comparison, Pavano’s average fastball velocity of 87.9 MPH is over 2 mph faster than Paul Byrd’s).

The renewed life on Pavano’s pitches and his aggressive nature are probably what Shapiro was referring to when he cited those seven starts. Shapiro also has a point in citing Pavano’s motivation to succeed in 2009. If this guy has any pride at all (athletes at this level usually do), he’ll be working his butt off to prove everyone (especially New York) wrong. The tools to achieve modest success are there, but Pavano’s health is going to have the final say no matter what.

Performance aside, I really can’t argue with the way Pavano’s contract is structured. Pavano’s one year contract guarantees him $1.5 million with another $5.3 million locked up in performance incentives. His incentives package is broken down by starts and innings, as described by Cot’s:

Starts: $0.1M each for 18, 20, 22; $0.2M each for 26, 28; $0.25M for 30; $0.3M for 32; $0.35M each for 33, 34; $0.4M for 35

Innings: $0.1M each for 130, 140, 150; $0.15M each for 160, 170; $0.2M for 180; $0.25M each for 190, 200, 210; $0.3M for 215; $0.4M for 225; $0.5M for 235

An easier way of reading it is if Pavano starts 20 games and averages 6 innings per start, he will earn an extra $0.1 million. If he were to average 6.5 innings over the same 20 starts, he’d earn just $0.2 million. Thirty starts (!) at 5.5 innings per and he’d earn $1.2 million in incentives.

Even if Pavano exceeds all expectations and starts 20 games for Cleveland, they’ll only be paying him about $1.6 million for his services. There’s a remote chance Pavano makes even 10-15 starts this season, but if there’s any chance that Cleveland could get some quality innings out of Pavano then it’s worth betting the $1.5 mil to see what happens. Many fans are comparing Pavano’s deal to the one-year contract Kevin Millwood had in 2005, but I don’t see much similarity beyond the structure of their contracts.

Millwood was guaranteed $3 million with up to $4 million in incentives, most of which focused on his ability to stay healthy (he would have lost money for each day spent on the DL). Millwood more than earned his keep that year by posting a 2.86 ERA, 1.21 WHIP, and 2.80 K/BB ratio over 192 IP. In addition to mentoring Sabathia and Lee on the finer points of pitching, Millwood finished sixth in AL Cy Young voting and won the AL ERA title. Plus, Millwood had averaged 34.5 starts, 219.5 IP, and a 114 ERA+ from 2002-2003 before succumbing to injury in 2004 and had a more reliable track record than Pavano ever did.

Cleveland is taking a shot in the dark with Pavano, since no one can draw any kind of reasonable conclusion as to whether he’ll be effective or healthy enough to even hold down a spot in the rotation. Shapiro has gone on record saying if Pavano is healthy, he will be guaranteed a spot in the rotation on Opening Day. What type of pitcher will show up in April is anybody’s guess, but I’m hoping for at least $1 million worth of quality innings until Westbrook is 100% healthy again. I have a feeling the Indians aren’t hoping for much more than that either. I suppose if Pavano can’t make it until July (Westbrook’s projected return), Plan B would be to see if one of the plethora of rookies sticks as a temporary starter.

I still have an uneasy feeling about Cleveland’s rotation, not unlike how I felt when Borowski was designated closer at the beginning of last season. There are just too many “ifs” involved right now. Lee can’t be expected to carry the rotation on his back all season, even after an outstanding Cy Young campaign. If anything, Cleveland should be vigilant about Lee’s workload and pitch action after he threw a career high 223.3 innings (Lee is also aware of this issue, ensuring extra training/recovery time by skipping the WBC).

Meanwhile, the 24-year old Carmona spent most of 2008 trying to get back on track after enduring a hangover from the 215 innings he logged in his sophomore season. I feel that Carmona’s ability to return to form is the key to Cleveland’s rotation this season, even more so than Lee. There’s little reason to think Lee won’t live up to his ace status with another strong season (even with the typical regression), but there is a lot of pressure on Carmona to bounce back and be a legitimate number two starter.

I really like Anthony Reyes’ upside, but he started just six games with Cleveland after a couple of rough seasons in St. Louis. Six starts is not a lot to go on, so it seems Cleveland is banking on his potential to breakout at age 26 in his new surroundings.

Aaron Laffey (93.7 IP, 105 ERA+) and Jeremy Sowers (121 IP, 80 ERA+) both struggled in Cleveland last season, although Sowers did bounce back in Buffalo with a 2.08 ERA, 1.20 WHIP, and 2.52 K/BB ratio over 60.2 innings (when has he not bounced back in Buffalo though?). Scott Lewis (4 GS, 24 IP) and Zach Jackson (16 GS, 92 IP) have limited experience as ML starters. Twenty three year old David Huff rounds out the group of young southpaws with a strong 2008 season in AAA, but no ML experience. There are no signs of Cleveland deviating from their plan to convert Adam Miller into a full-time bullpen arm, so he won’t be available as a starter in 2009.

I realize the five pitchers I just named are mostly under consideration for one rotation spot, although I would consider Pavano’s spot wide open as well. My point is that no one behind Lee and Carmona can truly be counted on to a.) pitch effectively for most of the season b.) stay healthy or c.) not pitch like a rookie who is in way over his head. Maybe I’m just being paranoid about the Tribe’s pitching after having to suffer through the heinous nightmare that was the 2008 bullpen. In my pessimistic opinion though, the starting rotation could be this year’s Achilles heel.

Fun Fact:

After the C.C. Sabathia trade on July 7, Cleveland finished the season with a 44-30 record (.594 WP), including a 10 game winning streak from August 17-27. A .594 WP on the season would have qualified for the AL wild card.

DeRosa Completes 2009 Infield

2009-01-03T01:32:00.004-05:00

The Tribe's 2009 infield appears to be set. Cleveland acquired uber-utilityman Mark DeRosa from the Cubs for Jeff Stevens and two other minor league pitchers on New Years Eve. Unlike Cleveland's three previous trades where a veteran player (Sabathia, Blake, Gutierrez) was dealt to bolster the farm system, the team did not have to give up any established Major Leaguers to fill their infield hole. Word on the street is that Chicago is trying to trim their payroll to bring in a free agent (probably Milton Bradley), although I'm surprised they gave up such a versatile player in DeRosa.

DeRosa is similar to Casey Blake in that he can play solid defense at several positions. He saw most of his starts at second base (80) and the corner outfield positions (53), with a few starts at third (10). He has split the majority of his career between second, third, and short over eleven Major League seasons. DeRosa received limited playing time in his first five seasons, but finally broke through at age 31 with Texas (coincidentally, he was in line for a new contract that year). Rather than level out after securing a new three-year contract, DeRosa developed into a valuable starter for Chicago and posted career highs in homeruns, OBP, and runs scored in 2008.

Mark DeRosa 2006-2008 Seasons

Year	Team	Age	PA	HR	OBP	SLG	OPS+	WS
2006	TEX	31	572	13	.357	.456	108	14
2007	CHC	32	574	10	.371	.420	102	17
2008	CHC	33	593	21	.376	.481	118	23

Last season, DeRosa was tied for third among all starting ML second basemen in OBP (only Utley and Brian Roberts had a better mark). Perhaps even more impressive was that his .376 OBP tied for fifth among all starting ML third basemen as well (only Aramis Ramirez, David Wright, ARod, and Chipper Jone were better). He is projected to bat second in the order, a spot that has been a bit of a revolving door under Manager Eric Wedge (hopefully DeRosa can provide some stability here). I'm pretty optimistic that DeRosa will continue to post strong offensive numbers because his ability to reach base relies heavily on walks, rather than just a high batting average or pure speed. DeRosa had 147 hits in 574 PAs with a .371 OBP in 2007. He was able to boost an already outstanding OBP by five points in 2008, even though he had three fewer hits and 19 more PAs. His pitch selection at the plate has also improved for three straight seasons, with a 0.43, 0.62, and 0.65 BB/K ratio, respectively.

DeRosa's power numbers are expected to decline some due to the switch from Wrigley Field (1.163 HR park factor) to the Jake (.824 HR park factor), but 13-15 homers are certainly possible. With the exception of a freakish spike in homers (21 in 2008, career high of 13 at the notorious Rangers Ballpark in 2006), DeRosa's numbers don't show any of the typical warning signs of an imminent decline. His linedrive percentage has remained steady for the past three seasons (22.3% average) and his 2008 BABIP of .325 was actually very close to his career mark of .320, so it's not like DeRosa was performing any miracles last year.

If Choo ends up as the starting right fielder, DeRosa is a perfect fit to platoon there against left handed pitching. Choo has a career .913 OPS against righties, but has just a .703 OPS against lefties. DeRosa owns an .847 career OPS against lefties. Carroll tends to have more success against left handers as well, making him the logical choice to man third with DeRosa in the outfield. DeRosa also finally gives Cleveland a prototypical second-slot batter with an excellent OBP to follow Sizemore in the lineup. DeRosa's matured patience at the plate, above-average baserunning, versatility on defense, and playoff experience provides the Tribe with a significant upgrade over Jamey Carroll, Andy Marte, and Josh Barfield.

Now, the first thing I thought of when we picked up Mark DeRosa was: didn't we just trade this guy? And what happened to his beard? Personally, I think DeRosa is a better overall player than Blake and I really like this trade. Some fans may be wondering why Cleveland traded away three pitching prospects for a player comparable to Blake though. First, Cleveland got back a ridiculous amount of value for Blake. Twenty-two year old catcher Carlos Santana is an absolute stud in the minors and is the heir apparent to Victor Martinez behind the plate right now (assuming Victor signs beyond 2010 and moves to first base, that would be awesome). As if that wasn't enough for Blake's expiring contract, the Dodgers threw in a young, cheap, future closer candidate in Jon Meloan.

Second, the exclusive negotiating period Cleveland would have had by keeping Blake in a lost season wouldn't have mattered one bit, since the team was never interested in keeping him long-term anyway. I was happy to see Blake get a good contract (he's actually been an above average player for the past five seasons, so he deserved some job security), but he just wasn't a good fit for Cleveland at this point.

Blake ended up with a three year, guaranteed contract worth $17 million (he'll be making $5 mil next year). It's not a stretch to say Cleveland had Blake at his peak and the Dodgers signed the 34 year-old with his most productive seasons behind him. Projected performance aside, there wouldn't have been room for Blake on the roster beyond the 2009 season. Luis Valbuena is a strong candidate to take over second base in a year, which would move Peralta to third. Top third base prospect Wes Hodges is also on track to make an impact by 2010 as well. So if Cleveland had met Blake's demands to fill an urgent need for 2009, they would have basically been stuck with a very expensive bench player once the next wave of young (and more talented) players emerged.

DeRosa is a much better fit for Cleveland because he only has one year left on his contract and is actually half a million cheaper than Blake was in 2008. Cleveland needed to bring in a veteran infielder one way or another so they didn't have to gamble on a rookie infielder or mess with yet another replacement level platoon. Plus, if DeRosa plays well enough to become a Type-A free agent when he walks at the end of the season, Cleveland could quickly recoup the loss of one of the Single-A prospects they traded.

Just for fun, let's compare Cleveland's former third baseman to recent acquisition DeRosa. I added Jamey Carroll to show what the team would have had to settle for if they hadn't of picked up DeRosa, since a platoon of Valbuena and Carroll was really the only viable infield option available in-house (I don't have much faith in Barfield).

Indians Infielders 2008 Stats

Player	Age	PA	HR	OBP	SLG	OPS+	WS	2009 Salary
C. Blake	34	601	21	.345	.463	110	18	$5 mil
M. DeRosa	33	593	21	.376	.481	118	23	$5.5 mil
J. Carroll	34	402	1	.355	.346	85	10	$2.5 mil

DeRosa was significantly better than Blake in every category last season, while Carroll doesn't stand up to either player. In fact, DeRosa's OBP pretty much crushes Blake's over the last two seasons (especially 2008). Blake also trails in OPS+ by eight points and falls just short of DeRosa's average performance the past three seasons (108.3 vs. 109.3 OPS+). Perhaps the best indicator of the type of upgrade Cleveland made at third is the difference in win shares. DeRosa was much more valuable to his team last season, with a five point advantage over Blake in total win shares. I think the team would be more than happy to pay that extra half a million to DeRosa if he can contribute a couple extra wins for 2009.

I don't feel like Cleveland had to give up much to acquire DeRosa from the Cubs. Jeff Stevens is the only player ready to make a contribution at the Major League level, but his role with the club was uncertain in such a crowded bullpen. Meanwhile, the 19 year-old Archer and 23 year-old Gaub seem to have a lot of potential, but are both still developing as players. The way I see it, Cleveland traded away an extra, unproven bullpen arm and two potential relievers who are still multiple years away from contributing (if they ever make it to the Majors) for a low-risk, relatively inexpensive veteran infielder that they absolutely needed.

For more information on the three pitching prospects above, I would highly recommend Tony Lastoria's blog. I seriously wouldn't have had any idea who Archer or Gaub were without Lastoria's scouting reports, so check it out.

Cleveland's Return on the Gutz Trade

2008-12-15T21:58:00.012-05:00

Cleveland made a surprise move before leaving Las Vegas on Thursday, acting as a bridge for the Mariners and Mets to complete a 12 player deal. Part of the trade involved Franklin Gutierrez heading to Seattle, with the Tribe getting reliever Joe Smith from New York and second baseman Luis Valbuena from Seattle.

It was no secret the rebuilding Mariners were shopping closer J.J. Putz and the Mets had been inquiring about every available closer at the Winter Meetings before signing Francisco Rodriguez. Tribe GM Mark Shapiro had been in discussions with Seattle about Putz before, but pulled back once negotiations with Kerry Wood started to yield results. Combine that with Shapiro’s strong relationship with Mets GM Omar Minaya and it’s easy to see where much of the groundwork for Cleveland’s involvement came from. Shapiro admitted the deal came together “remarkably quickly,” often the case when a transaction occurs on the last night of the Winter Meetings at 2:00am.

Obviously the Mets main goal was to further bolster their bullpen, although some might argue that acquiring a second closer to go with Rodriguez’s new contract borders on overkill. Omar Minaya has some guts in trading for Putz and relegating him to the setup role. Putz had explicitly stated before the trade that he wanted to remain a closer, so he couldn’t have been too happy about becoming K-Rod’s sidekick. On the plus side, Putz will get to play for a contender again and may be in line for a big payday in two years depending on his performance.

After compiling a 1.86 ERA and 76 saves the past two seasons, Putz’s 2008 season jumped the track when he suffered a rib injury in April and a hyperextended right elbow in June. Putz’s trademark is the strikeout, backing up his 95 MPH fastball with an 11.04 K/9 average the past three seasons. If Putz makes a 100% recovery from his elbow injury, the Mets could have a ridiculous one-two punch to close out games. Putz’s two remaining contract years ($5 mil and an $8.6 mil club option) make him a pricey setup man, but he could turn out to be a bargain if he returns to form. There have been some questions regarding how sustainable Putz’s peripherals are and the recent injuries only compound the issue. It will be interesting to see how he bounces back from a sub-par 2008.

Seattle got back a slew of young players in the deal, including four major leaguers and three minor leaguers. Below are the 12 players on the move:

New York gets: J.J. Putz (RP), Jeremy Reed (CF), Sean Green (RP)

Seattle gets: Aaron Heilman (RP), Endy Chavez (OF), Jason Vargas (RP), Franklin Gutierrez (OF), Ezequiel Carrera (OF), Mike Carp (1B), Maikel Cleto (RP)

Cleveland gets: Joe Smith (RP), Luis Valbuena (2B)

With the obvious exception of Franklin, I don’t know much about the package of players Seattle received. In general, Mariners fans seem to like the trade, which is probably a good indicator of the value they got back. Since I’d like to focus on how the trade will impact the Tribe, I’ll leave the analysis of Seattle’s return in the hands of baseball guru Dave Cameron at U.S.S. Mariner.

Joe Smith

Year	Age	Level	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	K/9	BB/9	AVG	ERA+
2006	22	A-	20	0.45	0.65	9.33	12.60	1.35	.151	N/A
		AA	13	5.54	1.77	1.09	8.53	7.82	.251	N/A
2007	23	AAA	9	2.00	1.22	1.25	5.00	4.00	.216	N/A
		MLB	44.3	3.45	1.55	2.14	9.14	4.26	.277	123
2008	24	MLB	63.3	3.55	1.29	1.68	7.39	4.41	.222	118

Smith is expected to start the season in the Cleveland bullpen and should see a significant workload in 2009. GM Mark Shapiro views Smith as “an important part of the back end of a 'pen," which probably means we’ll see him contribute in the 7^th and 8^th innings if all goes well. Smith broke in with the Mets in 2007 and has logged two successful Major League seasons. I don’t think I’d call Smith a prospect anymore because he seems to have established himself at the ML level at this point. Most of Smith’s appearances with New York came in the 7^th and 8^th innings in low leverage situations.

For what it’s worth, Smith’s 3.55 ERA, 1.29 WHIP, and 1.67 K/BB over 63.3 IP made him one of the best options in the Mets’ bullpen for 2008. Historically, Smith has struggled against left handed batters. Lefties compiled a .309 / .427 / .454 line in 23.2 IP versus Smith over his career. Smith is very effective against righties though, posting a .223 / .317 / .326 career line in 84.0 IP. Smith’s struggles against left handed batters are probably in large part due to his sidearm delivery (batters in the left side of the box are able to pick up on his delivery better). Until Smith develops a way to better deal with lefties, he will continue to be limited as a righty-specialist in the late innings.

Smith had a solid K/9 rate of 7.39 in 2008, but his 4.41 BB/9 rate points to occasional control issues (he still managed to throw over 60% of his pitches for strikes). His sidearm style allowed him to induce a ton of groundball outs, with 62.6% of his batted balls going for grounders. Being an extreme groundball pitcher probably helps him stay out of trouble despite a high walk rate. Overall, Smith was an above average reliever in 2008 with a 118 ERA+.

Smith’s trademark is his sidearm delivery and sinking fastball. According to Josh Kalk’s Pitch f/x database, Smith’s fastball has an average speed of 91.19 MPH and was used almost 68% of the time in 2008. His fastball has such a strong bite that Pitch f/x actually classifies it as a sinker. Smith’s secondary pitch is a slider with good movement and an average speed of 82.05 MPH.

Smith takes advantage of his deceptive delivery and extreme pitch movement by pounding right-handers inside with his fastball before pulling the string with the slider outside. He rarely went inside with the slider and used it about 32% of the time overall. The slider is Smith’s go-to pitch in potential strikeout situations where he is ahead in the count. While the slider shows up over 55% of the time in a favorable count, the fastball is utilized over 90% of the time when he’s fallen behind.

Unfortunately, I couldn’t find a video of Smith’s delivery, but his release point tends to fall between four and five feet off the ground (most pitchers have a release point of at least six feet). Smith switched to the sidearm delivery after his college coach recommended it as a way to improve his control. The suggestion worked so well that Smith went from a college baseball walk-on in 2004 to a 3^rd round MLB draft pick in 2006. Smith describes how his delivery has evolved in a recent Washington Post interview:

"My delivery now is a little different than the way I threw in college. In college, the delivery was putting a lot more stress on my arm. Now, there's not as much stress on my arm, so I don't feel as sore. I'm still learning how to pitch to big league hitters. I don't think I'll ever stop trying to learn more about how to do this."

Smith has weathered a pretty rapid transition from college ball to the Majors. Considering he is still developing as a pitcher in both his delivery and approach, I think there is a lot of potential for improvement over the next few seasons. Tony Lastoria believes “the key to [Smith] becoming more effective against left-handers and a potential setup man is the development of a changeup.” Hopefully the Tribe can continue to improve Smith’s changeup (he used it sparingly in 2008) and allow him to emerge from his current specialist role.

With the addition of Kerry Wood and Joe Smith and prospects like Adam Miller, Tony Sipp, Jeff Stevens, and John Meloan waiting in the wings, Cleveland’s bullpen is due for a major overhaul in 2009. Given his potential ceiling, previous experience, and dominance against right-handers, Smith is better than your average depth acquisition and could become a significant arm in the pen next season.

Luis Valbuena

Valbuena is considered the centerpiece of Cleveland’s return in this deal. Based on the suddenness of the trade, I had a feeling Valbuena was not meant as the answer to Cleveland’s infield needs. Shapiro confirmed this theory by stating Valbuena “could be a guy who factors into our big league picture, depending on how our offseason concludes. But he's not our infield piece right now." In other words, Valbuena will be starting the season with Buffalo so he can build on the substantial progress he made last season. The fact that Shapiro left the door open for Valbuena to contribute in the Majors in 2009 tells you something about his potential in the eyes of the GM.

I think Cleveland’s plan is to start Valbuena in AAA and allow him to build on his break-out season. Valbuena’s offensive numbers surged during his age-22 season, culminating in his Major League debut with Seattle. Below are Valbuena’s peripherals for the last two seasons:

Year	Age	Level	PA	OBP	SLG	wOBA	PA/K	BB/K	ISO
2007	21	AA	505	.313	.378	.304	6.08	0.58	.140
2008	22	AA	277	.384	.483	.378	7.48	0.84	.179
		AAA	246	.383	.373	.339	7.68	0.88	.071
		MLB	54	.315	.347	.298	4.90	0.36	.102

There are a few positive signs in Valbuena’s minor league performance. He spent the entire 2007 season toiling in AA and only had modest offensive numbers to show for it. He was striking out almost 19% of the time and did not show much patience at the plate. Valbuena took what he learned in 2007 and ran with it, becoming a much more disciplined hitter in the process. By honing his batting eye and showing more patience, Valbuena was able to reduce his strikeouts and collect more walks. Once he started to get on base more, his overall offensive production (represented here by wOBA) improved by .074 points compared to his previous season in AA. Valbuena also started to make better contact with the ball, pushing his ISO up from .140 to .179.

Seattle rewarded Valbuena’s work ethic with a promotion to AAA mid-season. Even though his power numbers took a nosedive in his first exposure to AAA pitching, Valbuena’s OBP held steady while his strikeout and walk rates actually improved. This is the most important trend from Valbuena’s time in the upper-minors. Despite having to adjust to tougher pitching in AAA, his ability to reach base and earn walks continued to improve. Valbuena’s power numbers should bounce back naturally as long as he continues to see the ball well. He may also develop more power in his swing as he ages. Many young players tend to press and go for the long ball, so the opposite trend will occur (OBP and K head south at the expense of a few more extra base hits). Valbuena has done a good job of avoiding this pitfall.

Most Cleveland fans (my self included) haven’t seen Valbuena in the field before, but Jeff at Lookout Landing provides his take on Valbuena’s glove:

“The thing that excited me most about Valbuena, though, was his defense. Don't bother looking at his defensive statistics; given the sample size, they won't tell you anything. Trust your eyes. If you watched Valbuena around second base this past month, you saw him make a lot of plays deep to his right, along with a couple that required him to come charging in towards the plate. I don't recall seeing him go to his left very often, but that's kind of out of his control. What's important is that, in his limited playing time, Valbuena was able to showcase both above-average range and above-average instincts with a pretty good arm. That's big. This team [Seattle] badly needs some better defense going forward, and now that I've seen Valbuena play his position, I'm pretty confident saying that he could play a solid second base in the Majors Leagues right now.”

Sounds good to me.

The adjustments Valbuena made between 2007 and 2008 look like they have a good chance of sticking and probably made him an appealing prospect to the Tribe. It took Valbuena one and a half seasons in AA before he was ready to move up, so one more season in AAA would seem like a logical move here. Unless he really catches fire (or Shapiro fails to land a new infielder), I doubt we’ll see Valbuena in Cleveland until the rosters expand in September. Valbuena could break in with the club by taking over Jamey Carroll’s utility role in the 2010 season.

Bottom Line

I like this trade in theory: dealing from an area of depth (corner outfielders) to fill in two definite needs elsewhere (bullpen and high level infield prospects). As a fan, Gutz was one of my favorite players to watch, but I think it was a smart move to trade him. Cleveland has another wave of quality outfielders who are near-ML ready and there would have been a serious crunch on the 25-man roster at some point. Plus, Gutz's value probably wouldn't have gotten much better than it already was anyway. In a way, Cleveland did Gutz a favor because now he can be a starter in centerfield, taking full advantage of his defensive prowess. I figured Gutz would have gone as part of a package for a bigger return, but I'm satisfied with what we got back for him.

Gutz to be Traded: Full Updates Coming Soon

2008-12-10T23:02:00.003-05:00

Well, I was going to have a piece about Kerry Wood go up tonight. At least until I got severely distracted by a three team deal involving Cleveland, Seattle, and the Mets. Nothing has been finalized yet, but word on the street has Franklin Gutierrez going to Seattle, while Cleveland will receive reliever Joe Smith from New York and 22 year old second baseman Luis Valbuena from Seattle. Here's what the deal looks like as of 11:00pm:

Mets get: pitchers J.J. Putz and Sean Green, outfielder Jeremy Reed

Mariners get: outfielders Franklin Gutierrez and Endy Chavez, pitcher Aaron Heilman, first baseman Mike Carp

Indians get: pitcher Joe Smith, second baseman Luis Valbuena

I found this information on beatwriter Anthony Castrovince's blog, which tends to be a pretty reliable source for Tribe transactions.

Like I said, this deal is not final yet and the players may not land in the exact places listed above. I just wanted to get something posted tonight, so there ya go.

I'll be taking a closer look at the Kerry Wood signing, this trade, and the free agent infielders in my next few posts, so remember to check back later.

Scouting the FA Closers

2008-12-04T17:54:00.009-05:00

As you probably know by now, Cleveland is shopping for a closer this off-season. The Tribe is looking to either sign or trade for an established closer, although their budget is not entirely clear. I felt that the best combination of reliability, experience, and value on the free agent market was Trevor Hoffman, which you can read about here. Cleveland supposedly talked with Hoffman, Fuentes, Rodriguez, and Jason Isringhausen. I was originally going to do a list of free agents and trade targets, but I think I’ll just round out the free agents Cleveland has an interest in and pick up on any trade rumors after the winter meetings (in case you were wondering, Matt Capps is at the top of my wish-list on that front).

2.) Kerry Wood

2008 Team: Cubs
Age: 31
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $4.2 mil (2008), plus up to $3.45 mil for performance bonuses

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
K. Wood	34 (85.0%)	66.1	3.26	1.09	137	7.33	2.44	11.40	4.67

As much as I hyped up Trevor Hoffman earlier, I think I’d be pretty happy if the team went with Kerry Wood instead. Wood is an interesting option considering he has 10 MLB seasons under his belt, but just completed his first as a closer. After logging 174, 213, and 211 innings as a starter from 2001 to 2003, Wood struggled to stay healthy. Between 2004 and 2006, Wood suffered from an array of injuries and underwent surgery on his knee and rotator cuff. The Cubs finally decided to try and conserve Wood's electric arm by converting him to a reliever in 2007. The relief stint got off to a rough start as Wood spent most of the season battling elbow issues (he did not return to Chicago until August). Wood expressed a strong preference to stay in Chicago, taking an incentives based $4.2 million dollar contract after filing for free agency after the 2007 season.

Wood would have been the perfect Shapiro project a year ago; battered by injuries with a high payoff when healthy. Wood's 2008 run as the Cubs closer jump-started the former ace's career and probably put him in line for a hefty raise. Wood officially hit the open market Monday after the Cubs declined to offer him arbitration. The Cubs have made it clear they are moving on without Wood, even though he has offered to take a one year deal to stay with the team. Chicago balked at Wood's supposed $9+ million salary and have already anointed Carlos Marmol as closer.

Wood's value significantly increased after 2008 due to his success as closer and the fact that he was able to stay healthy for the entire season. The only major setback for Wood was in July when he suffered from a blister on his right index finger and was placed on the 15-day DL. Wood isn't exactly a veteran closer, but he is a veteran starter. He has already proven that he has the mentality to handle the closer role and is a seasoned playoff pitcher. His 85.0% save percentage last year was comparable to elite closers like Joe Nathan (86.6%) and B.J. Ryan (88.8%).

Despite owning the lowest save percentage and highest ERA between Fuentes and Rodriguez, I would take Wood if all I had to go by were the numbers. Wood’s ERA was inflated by a few bad outings, particularly in July when he was probably trying to work around a blister on one of his throwing fingers. Other than the three isolated appearances where he gave up three runs and a bad stretch in September where he surrendered 7 runs in 3.1 innings, Wood was very reliable. He may have blown six saves, but three of those came before May 2. After that, all Wood did was rack up consecutive saves.

Wood’s H/9 rate was slightly higher than K-Rod and Fuentes, but Wood’s outstanding combination of a 2.44 BB/9 rate and 11.40 K/9 rate really puts him ahead of the competition. Even though he gave up more hits, Wood had the best WHIP, K/BB ratio, and HR/9 rate of the three. Wood’s combination of strikeouts and precision place him ahead of pack in terms of overall pitching ability and I feel that his numbers are fairly sustainable. Several stats seem likely to regress based strictly on Wood’s career totals, although I’m not sure it’s fair to directly compare his time as a starter to that as a reliever. If you consider Wood’s ability as a starter and remove all the pitfalls of starting (late inning fatigue, loss of focus, multiple ABs per batter, etc.) it seems very reasonable to think that Wood would see a significant improvement in performance if all of his effort were distilled down to just one or two innings per outing.

If Wood can stay healthy this season, there’s a strong chance he’ll be a lights-out closer.

While I'm not sure about the exact amount, I think his price per year will fall between Fuentes and Hoffman. I don't see him giving other teams the option of a one year deal like he offered to Chicago (that was motivated more by his own desire to stay in Chicago than anything else). If I were Wood's agent I would advise him to seek a three to four year deal given that this is his first real venture as a free agent and his history of injury. The 31 year old Wood may not have another shot at a big, multi-year contract depending on how his body holds up. It's not clear how heavily teams are weighing Wood's prior injuries (no pun intended), but if other GMs hesitate to sign him to three or four years Cleveland may step in with the next best thing.

Considering how important it is that Cleveland's closer be a consistent presence (read, healthy) this season, I'm not sure Wood is the best choice for Cleveland. Still, K-Rod has been deflecting rumors about the condition of his arm this off-season, while Trevor Hoffman is 41 years old. It’s tough to tell where Cleveland would rank Wood in terms of injury risk (you can bet someone is poring over his latest physical and 2008 tapes though). Personally, I think I’d take a chance on Wood if he could be had for a reasonable contract.

I could see Cleveland offering a two year guaranteed contract at $6-8 million per year, plus a team option, with another $2-3 million in incentives based on appearances and DL stints. Again, the market will likely dictate whether Wood ends up considering anything less than three years at $9-10 million per. Texas is rumored to be pretty high on Wood and has a history of burning money in free agency, so expect some stiff competition to drown out concerns about Wood's past injuries.

3.) Brian Fuentes

2008 Team: Colorado
Age: 33
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $5.05 mil (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
B. Fuentes	30 (88.2%)	62.2	2.73	1.10	168	6.75	3.16	11.78	3.73

Fuentes appears to be the Mets’ primary target right now. Based on Fuentes' scheduled meeting with the Mets in Vegas and how desperate New York is for a closer to replace the ailing Billy Wagner, I'd say Fuentes will be off the market before the Winter Meetings conclude. While Cleveland did express an interest in Fuentes, I don't see them getting into a bidding war with the Mets (never a good idea).

Fuentes managed to have the best season of his career in 2008 despite logging over half his innings in the Major’s third best hitters park (Coors Field). Below are his home/away splits for the past three seasons:

Brian Fuentes 2008 Season Splits

Location	Year	IP	ERA	WHIP	SLGA	K/BB
Home	2006	34.2	3.63	1.21	.410	4.44
	2007	31.1	1.72	0.83	.292	3.00
	2008	33.1	3.51	1.29	.357	4.80

Away	2006	30.2	3.23	1.11	.324	1.94
	2007	30.0	4.50	1.43	.350	2.13
	2008	29.1	1.84	0.89	.210	3.40

Finding success in Colorado as a pitcher is no easy task. You either face a thin-aired, slugger’s paradise at home or a foreign, hostile environment on the road. I guess it’s not that surprising that Fuentes’ home and away splits tend to fluctuate each year. I expected his ERA and SLGA to heavily favor his time at Coors, but if you take the past three seasons as a whole, there seems to be a rough equilibrium. In 2006, Fuentes posted similar numbers at home (3.63 ERA, 1.21 WHIP) and away (3.23 ERA, 1.11 WHIP). In 2007, he dominated batters at home (1.72 ERA, 0.83 WHIP), but got roughed up to the tune of a 4.50 ERA and 1.43 WHIP on the road. In his walk year, the splits reversed: stellar away (1.84 ERA, 0.89 WHIP), significantly less so at home (3.51 ERA, 1.29 WHIP).

Even Fuentes’ slugging against (SLGA) follows this pattern, although you’d expect opposing batters to consistently collect more extra base hits against him at Coors Field than in most other stadiums.

Fuentes’ overall performance as Colorado’s closer has been pretty solid, averaging 62.8 IP, 3.08 ERA, 1.12 WHIP, and 155 ERA+ over the past three seasons (his 78.7 save percentage represents some really shaky stretches in ’06 and ’07 though). The main thing I was curious about was if Fuentes would see a significant improvement in performance once he got away from Coors Field. Based on a rough analysis of his splits, I don’t think he’ll see any major improvements in the future, at least not due to a change of address. I don’t see Fuentes’ value slipping very much, but his 2008 season will probably go down as a career year for him.

Again, as long as his contract remains reasonable (unlikely) then Fuentes will provide an experienced, quality arm, but probably won’t meet the Mets’ expectations as closer based on his inability to dominate in high leverage situations on a consistent basis (career 80.0 SV%)

4.) Francisco Rodriguez

2008 Team: Anaheim
Age: 26
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $10 mil (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
F. Rodriguez	62 (89.8%)	68.1	2.24	1.29	198	7.11	4.48	10.14	2.26

I’m probably going to get torched for ranking Rodriguez near the bottom...oh well (not that my made-up “ranking” system ever meant anything).

The market seems to have cooled on Rodriguez and his record 62 saves. At one point, Rodriguez was seeking Mariano Rivera money (you know, 1.40 ERA, .66 WHIP, 39 saves for the umpteenth time in his career…that Rivera), or around $15 million a year on a long term contract. Amazingly, no one appears to have taken the bait and the hype surrounding Rodriguez is dim heading into the Winter Meetings.

Except for a 2.24 ERA and 62 saves, Rodriguez was only average in a direct comparison to Wood, Fuentes, and Hoffman. Rodriguez actually had the worst WHIP and K/BB ratio, which doesn’t make sense when paired with his sparkling ERA. At first glance, it looks like Rodriguez had quite a bit of luck on his side to allow so many baserunners with minimal damage. Let’s peel back another layer here:

2008 Closer FIPs

B. Fuentes: 2.24
K. Wood: 2.32
F. Rodriguez: 3.22
T. Hoffman: 3.99

Rodriguez’s FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) is nearly a full point higher than Wood and Fuentes, which suggests he was getting a significant boost from his team’s defense and other factors beside his performance on the mound. Would Rodriguez be able to duplicate his 89.8 save percentage without improving his WHIP and BB/9 rate next season? Probably not.

Speaking of walks, 2008 marks the second consecutive season Rodriguez has seen his BB/9, H/9, and HR/9 rates rise, while his K/9 rate dropped. The rising walk rates and apparent decline in control may be a sign of some early wear and tear in Rodriguez’s throwing arm. Regardless of why these issues are popping up for the 26 year old flamethrower, allowing an exponential amount of baserunners and taters each year is going to catch up with him at some point (probably sooner than later if his K rate fails to rebound).

Another issue that may be causing reluctance amongst GMs is Rodriguez’s declining velocity. I wouldn’t have thought to look it up before (the kid throws hard), but Rodriguez has lost at least a MPH off his fastball every year since 2006. Rodriguez threw his heater 56% of the time with an average speed of 94.8 MPH. In 2008, he had cut back on his fastball usage by 5.3% and had an average speed of 91.9 MPH. The same can be said of his slider, which lost 4.6 MPH since 2006. To compensate, Rodriguez threw nearly twice as many changeups in 2008 as he had in the past.

Normally, a 26 year old whose fastball is his bread and butter wouldn’t have to compensate for lost velocity by mixing in a new pitch. It’s not the combination of the pitches so much as the timing (plus the declining K/BB rate). If I were talking to K-Rod’s agent about a long-term deal, that would be a major point of concern for me.

So why am I digging into Rodriguez when there are plenty of other flawed closers on the market? Well, I felt that Rodriguez was severely overrated in 2008 (Cy Young, are you kidding me?) and find it interesting how his breaking the saves record seemed to overshadow a few red flags (like the persistent drop in velocity). Anaheim has never been afraid to spend to retain a player. You have to wonder, what did they see that caused them to pass on Rodriguez?

Basically, I feel sorry for the team that signs Rodriguez to a four or five year deal because I think they’ll be lucky to get two good years out of him. Then again, maybe the abundance of closers and lack of spare change will see some GMs (not to name anybo-Sabean) show a bit of restraint this off-season.

No matter how scouts are interpreting the above trends, Rodriguez is one of the most important free agents this winter (Sabathia and Teixeira are the others), since he will set the precedent for every reliever’s contract after him.

And no, I don’t think Cleveland will make him a serious offer.

5.) Jason Isringhausen

2008 Team: St. Louis
Age: 35
Previous Contract: 3 yrs / $25.75 mil (2005-07), plus $8 mil club option (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
Isringhausen	12 (41.67%)	42.2	5.70	1.64	78	10.12	4.64	7.59	1.64

After seeing his name on the list of pitchers Cleveland is talking to, I was forced to take a closer look at Izzy. Overall, I think a return to form is a definite possibility for Isringhausen. I wouldn’t bet the bullpen on it, but certainly possible. That said, I hope Shapiro views Isringhausen as a sort of last resort (including trades) in case the market goes totally nuts or something.

Isringhausen is currently rehabbing from September elbow surgery to repair a torn tendon in his throwing arm. He should be 100% healthy by the time Spring Training arrives. The veteran closer will have plenty of motivation after suffering through his worst season since 1999 when he was traded from the Mets to the Athletics mid-season. His 2008 campaign was derailed by a series of injuries including a hand laceration (kids, don't punch a tv after you blow a save; water coolers are a much cheaper alternative), knee strain, tendonitis, and the torn tendon. To add insult to injury, Izzy had his closer status revoked (twice). Isringhausen probably would have retired if he had reached his goal of 300 saves last season (he needs seven more).

I'm convinced Isringhausen's ugly season can be blamed solely on his injuries and he could be a fairly productive closer in 2009. The trouble is, most of Isringhausen's past struggles were caused by injury issues. He got off to a terrible start in 2006 as well. After an erratic season, he finally succumbed to a hip injury in early September and was left off the Cardinal's post season roster (Adam Wainwright closed out the World Series victory). A newly repaired Isringhausen went on to have a career year in 2007, posting a 2.48 ERA, 1.07 WHIP, and 32 saves (93.7%) in 65.1 IP. Over his age 31-34 seasons (2004-2007), Isringhausen averaged 64.4 IP, 162 ERA+, 1.19 WHIP, 2.07 K/BB ratio, and an 84.8 save percentage (a couple good seasons, one great one, and one with a major injury, seems about right). At worst, Isringhausen is a top 15 closer (actually, at worst he's a top 15 closer on the DL) and at best he's a top 5. Which Izzy is going to show up in 2009? No idea.

Isringhausen is kind of like a watered down Kerry Wood (minus the filthy K rate): when he's healthy he can be very productive, but the risk of injury tends to run high. However, if I had to choose one injury prone closer over another, Wood is the obvious choice. One benefit of signing Isringhausen is that he'll probably have one of the friendliest free agent contracts of 2009. After expressing his desire to pitch again Isringhausen described his next contract as an "incentive-based thing." Izzy would make sense as a depth signing, but not as the full-time closer. Since he has clearly stated he wants to close, Isringhausen won't be signing with Cleveland.

All contract information was taken from Cot's Baseball Contracts.